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RELEASE OF POWERS OF APPOINTMENT IN NEW YOIUZ
IN 1917 settlorl set up a trust fund,2 the income of which was to be paid to
his daughter3 for life. The trust deed gave her the power to appoint the principal
in her will to such of her issue or to such charitable corporations as she should
select; and, in default of appointment, it was provided that the principal be
divided into equal trust funds for the benefit of her children.4 In 1918 the donee
released her testamentary power of appointment to the settlor and trustee under
seal, and covenanted not to exercise it. The donee died in 1932, and in her will,
in which neither the trust fund nor the power of appointment was mentioned, she
bequeathed 4/12ths of her entire estate to one daughter, 2/12ths to her other
daughter, 1/12th to her son, and the residue to a stranger to the power, one
who was not related to her. In an action by the trustee for directions, the daughter
who was legatee of 4/12ths of the donee's estate contended that under the New
York statutes the power could not be released and that the will exercised the
power by appointing the principal of the trust fund to the three children of the
donee in shares proportional to their legacies under her will.5 Against this con-
tention, the referee held that the testamentary power of appointment could be
released by the donee, that the release executed by the donee to the settlor and
trustee was effective to extinguish that power, and, even assuming the power had
not been surrendered, that the will made no appointment under the power. He
held, therefore, that three equal trust funds be set up for the benefit of the three
children as provided in the trust deed in default of appointment.0
1. John D. Rockefeller, Sr.
2. The trust fund consisted of shares of capital stock of the Standard Oil Company
of Indiana. The value of the principal in 1917 was approximately $9,000,000. The original
annual income was $288,000 and until the death of the beneficiary in 1932 the fund pro-
duced an average annual income of $600,000.
3. Mrs. Edith Rockefeller McCormick.
4. Throughout the entire period relevant to this controversy all three of her children
survived. They are technically referred to as beneficiaries in default of appointment.
5. This daughter contends that she should take 4/7ths of the trust fund, her sister,
2/7ths, and her brother, 1/7th, since the three children must take the entire trust fund,
the residuary legatee being a stranger to the power of appointment, and since those shares
are proportional to their respective shares of 4/12ths, 2/12ths, and 1/12th of the donee's
estate under her will.
6. Chase National Bank of New York v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 19 Misc. 61,
279 N. Y. Supp. 327 (Sup. Ct. March 1935). The original trustee was the Equitable
Trust Co. That company in 1930 was consolidated with the Chase National Bank. The
defendant is the executor of the last will and testament of the donee.
On appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, the referee's conclusion was
affirmed, but with a partial disagreement in the reasoning. The Court held (Appellate
Division, 1st Dep't, Dec. 27, 1935) that the document of 1918 was ineffective to extinguish
the donee's power of appointment; but since it agreed with the referee that the will failed
to appoint the trust fund, it too held that the fund went in equal shares to the beneficinriC
in default of appointment. An appeal to the Court of Appeals is contemplated.
The opinion also considered the problem of allocation of stock dividends between prin-
cipal and income.
Whether the power involved in the instant case may be released is far from
clear in New York. The common law of powers, under which such testamentary
power could be released, has been abolished by statute;7 the statutory scheme
which purports to cover the entire field makes no mention of release of powers;
there is not a single case in New York which has filled this gap;8 and the adoption
of a confusing statutory classification of powers makes difficult a neat, logical
argument from the statute in terms of the common law decisions.0
The rule at common law is that special' 0 discretionary testamentary powers of
appointment, similar to the power under consideration, could be released by the
donee," it being clear, in view of the donor's provision for the contingency of
failure of appointment by a gift over in default thereof, that the donee was not
bound in equity to appoint.12 Nor is the donee prevented from releasing such
a power to appoint during his lifetime by the fact that it is testamentary, and
therefore intended to remain ambulatory until his death.13  This result has been
explained on the ground that at early common law a life tenant could, by fine,
7. NEW YoRx RnAx PROPERTY LAw (1917) §§ 130-182. "Powers, as they e~xisted by
law on the 31st day of December, 1829, are abolished. Hereafter the creation, construction
and execution of powers, affecting real property, shall be subject to the provisions of this
article." § 130. These provisions have been construed to apply also to powers over per-
sonal property. Matter of Moehring, 154 N. Y. 423, 48 N. E. 818 (1897).
The common law of powers has been replaced by a statutory scheme in Six other states.
Ac. Comp. LAws (1929) §§ 12995-13056; M=. STAT. (Ason's, 1927) §§ 8107-8167;
N. D. Coirp. LAws (1913) §§ 5381-5443; OKiA. STAr. (1931) §§ 11837-11898; S. D. Coiw.
LAws (1929) § 388-448; Wis. STAT. (1931) §§ 232.01-232.58. Al these statutes are
remarkably similar to one another, and none of them refers to the release of discretionary
powers of appointment
8. In only one case was the problem considered, and there the point was not settled,
the court deciding on some other ground. Newton v. Hunt, 134 App. Div. 325, 119 N. Y.
Supp. 3 (1st Dep't 1909), aftd, 201 N. Y. 599, 95 N. E. 1134 (1911).
9. For example, at common law, powers are classified as discretionary or imperative,
depending upon whether or not the donee was under a duty to exercise it. Under the
New York statute, powers are dassified as beneficial or in trust, depending upon whether
the donee may appoint to himself or not, and within each of those two classes, powers
may be discretionary or imperative. See Naw YoRx Rr, PRoPERTY LAW (1917) §5 133-138.
10. A power is said to be special, where, as in the principal case, appointees may be
selected only from particular classes, not including the donee of the power.
11. Smith v. Death, 5 Madd. 371 (ch. 1820); In re Evered (1910) 2 Ch. 147; Thorington
v. Thorington, 82 Ala. 489, 1 So. 716 (1887); Baker v. Wilmert, 288 Ill. 434, 123 N. E.
627 (1919); Columbia Trust Co. v. Christopher, 133 Ky. 335, 117 S. W. 943 (1909);
Langley v. Conlan, 212 Mass. 135, 98 N. E. 1064 (1912); Atkinson v. Dowling, 33 S. C.
414, 12 S. E. 93 (1890).
12. The donee of an imperative power, on the other hand, is under a duty to the
donor to appoint. Since a release would constitute a breach of that duty, Imprative
powers could not be released. T'TAAyr, REA PRopi n (2d ed. 1920) v. 1, 1105; Weller
v. Ker's Trustees, 1 Scot. L. R. 188 (1866); Saul v. Pattinson, 34 Whly. Rep. 561 (1886);
cf. In re Dunne's Trusts, L. R. 1 Ir. 516 (1878). And upon failure to appoint, equity will
execute the power. Davy v. Hooper, 2 Vern. 665 (ch. 1710); Fenwick v. Greenwell, 10 Beav.
412 (Rolls 1847); Wetmore v. Henry, 259 111. 80, 102 N. E. 189 (1913). This rule has been
incorporated in the New York statutory scheme of powers. See NEw YoR Rnmr, PnopE=nr
LAw (1917) § 157. Delaney v. McCormack, 88 N. Y. 174 (1882).
13. For a criticism of decisions holding such releases valid, see Gray, Release ad Dis.
charge of Powers (1911) 24 HARV. L. REV. 511, 517, 523. See note 11, supra.
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feoffment, or common recovery, tortiously convey in fee simple, and this convey-
ance estopped the donee from exercising the power, under the rule that one cannot
derogate from his own grant.14 The consistent line of decisions, giving effect to
such releases long after the doctrine of tortious conveyances has become obsolete, 15
indicates that more enduring considerations underlie the cases. Thus, by per-
mitting a life tenant to release his power of appointing the fee in favor of the
beneficiaries in default of appointment, the courts seem to have compromised
between conflicting policies, the one favoring free alienation of property, the other
seeking to carry out the intent of donors of powers. Such a holding enables the
property subject to the power to be conveyed in fee simple by the beneficiaries
in default of appointment joined by the donee; and, at the same time, the intent
of the donor is substantially carried out in that, although the power does not
remain ambulatory, the interests of those whom he has specified as beneficiaries in
default of appointment are protected by such release. Such considerations may
have moved the New York court to hold the special discretionary testamentary
power involved in the instant case releasable during the donee's lifetime, the New
York statutory provisions on powers being silent on the point.
It is held in the principal case without discussion that, if the power is capable
of being released, the document executed by the donee to the settlor and trustee
was effective for that purpose. Nevertheless, superficially at least, the so-called
release does not appear to satisfy the requisites normally encountered in documents
held effective to extinguish powers. The typical release runs to those persons
whose interest in the property subject to the power remains or may become
possessory upon the non-exercise of the power,16 and the operative effect of such
release is to give them immunity from the liability of appointment to other parties.
Thus, in cases in which releases of powers of appointment were held valid, the
releases ran to the beneficiaries in default of appointment, 17 were contained in
deeds and mortgages of land and ran to the purchasers' s and mortgagees 19 of the
property subject to the power, or were found in assignments of trust funds and
went to the assignees 20 who took the funds subject to the power. The joining
of the settlor in the release cannot be effective to extinguish the power under that
theory; for the settlor has no interest whatever in the trust fund, and is, there-
fore, under no liability of appointment from which a release might give him
immunity. 21 The release to the trustee, however, stands upon a different footing;
14. See Simes, Powers in Trust and the Termination of Powers by the Donee (1927)
37 YALE L. J. 63, 211, 213.
15. Releases have been effective to extinguish powers of appointment over personal
property, although the doctrine of tortious conveyances never applied to such Interest.
See Simes, op. cit. supra note 14, at 213.
16. "The extinction of a power is generally effected or attempted by a release of the
power to a person who has an interest in the property over which the power exists; as
when a life tenant having a general power of appointment by deed or will releasea the
power to the remainderman." Gray, op. cit. supra note 13, at 511.
17. Barton v. Briscoe, Jac. 603 (ch. 1822); Davies v. Huguenin, 2 Hem. & M. 730
(ch. 1863) ; in re Somes (1896) 1 Ch. 250.
18. Webb v. Lord Shaftesbury, 3 Myl. & K. 599 (ch. 1834); Columbia Trust Co. v.
Christopher, 133 Ky. 335, 117 S. W. 943 (1909); Baker v. Wilmert, 288 Ill. 434, 123 N. E.
627 (1919).
19. Langley v. Conlan, 212 Mass. 135, 98 N. E. 1064 (1912).
20. Cherry v. Boultbee, 2 Keen 319 (Rolls 1838) ; Smith v. Houblon, 26 Beav. 482 (1859).
21. The so-called release to the settler and the covenant by the donee not to exercise
the power, while not effective to extinguish the power, might create a contractual duty In
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for the trust deed provides that in default of appointment, the principal is to be
divided into equal trust funds for the benefit of the donee's children and that
the trustee is to retain legal title to those funds. Since that legal title is subject
to the exercise of the power,22 the release to the trustee is practically identical
in effect to the releases mentioned above, running to grantees, mortgagees, and
assignees of property subject to powers, and may be held to give the trustee
immunity from the liability of appointment on the same grounds.
The third holding in the principal case is that, even assuming that the power
had not been effectively released, the will of the donee did not constitute an
appointment under it. At common law, a will could exercise a testamentary power
of appointment held by the testator only if the power or the property subject
thereto were expressly referred to or if the gifts of the will would otherwise be
wholly inoperative; 23 but that rigid rule has been relaxed by statute in many
jurisdictions.24 Under the New York statute,25 a will purporting to pass all the
property of the testator is presumed to exercise a power of appointment held by
him unless the contrary intent appears expressly or by "necessary implication."
Although that statute has been liberally construed,2 0 the referee in the instant case
found by "necessary implication" the intention that the will was not to operate
as an execution of the power. That decision is supported by the facts of the case.
Since the value of the trust fund subject to the power was eight times greater
than that of the personal estate of testatrix, and since express reference was made
to the power in a prior will of 1931, the failure of the will to mention either the
power or the trust fund is evidence that the testatrix, although aware of the
existence of the power, did not affirmatively intend to exercise it. The fact that
testatrix had covenanted with the settlor and trustee not to exercise the power
and the fact that a construction of the will to appoint the trust fund would prob-
ably result in a partial appointment,2 7 since testatrix bequeathed only 7/12ths of
her property to permissible appointees, point to an intention not to exercise the
power, but rather to permit the trust fund to go to the beneficiaries in default of
appointment. Furthermore, the will provided that the share of the residuary
legatee should be increased if a child should predecease testatrix or contest the
the donee to the settlor, for breach of which the donee could be compelled to respond
in damages to the extent the settlor could prove he has suffered them. Since seals on
releases still have their common law effect in New York, the question of lack of con-
sideration does not arise. See Stiebel v. Grosberg, 202 N. Y. 266, 95 N. E. 692 (1911).
22. In default of appointment, only the beneficial interest passed to the children of the
donee; but the trust deed gave the donee the power to appoint the legal interest as well.
23. Nannock v. Horton, 7 Ves. Jr. 391 (ch. 1802); Harvard College v. Balch, 171 IM. 275,
49 N. E. 543 (1898); 4 Km,9--s Co,-=. *334, 335; KALEs, FuTuRz L T sRs (2d ed.
1920) § 641.
24. CAL. PROBATE CODE (1931) § 125; MD. CODE Ay. (Bagby, 1925) Art. 93, § 339;
MICH. CoNT. LAWS (1929) § 13047; AInm. GEx. ST,!LT. (Mason, 1927) § SISS; P=.".'.
STAT. A"--. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 223. See also THE Wmzs AcT, 7 Wim. IN' & 1 Vict.,
c. 26, § 27 (1837).
25. NEW YoRx PERsox-AL PROPERTY LAW (1917) § 18.
26. New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Livingston, 133 N. Y. 125, 30 N. E. 724 (1892);
Lockwood v. Mildeberger, 159 N. Y. 181, 53 N. E. 803 (1899); McLean v. McLean, 174
App. Div. 152, 160 N. Y. Supp. 949 (2d Dep't 1916); Contra: Stewart v. Keating, 15 Mi-c.
44, 36 N. Y. Supp. 913 (Sup. Ct. 1895); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Halsted, 245 N. Y. 447,
157 N. E. 739 (1927).
27. This alone, however, is not conclusive on the point that testatrix did not intend
to appoint. See Matter of Burling, 148 Misc. 835, 266 N. Y. Supp. 482 (Sur. CL 1933).
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will. Since the residuary legatee was a stranger to the power of appointment and
could take no portion of the trust fund in such contingencies, the dispositions of
property made in the will were "by their very nature inapplicable to the subject
of the power."
The decision has been affirmed by the Appellate Division,0 and due to the novelty
of the questions involved an appeal will probably be taken to the Court of Appeals.
A decision by that court may set at rest the doubtful status of releases under the
New York statutes on powers.
ASSIGNABILITY OF RIGHTS IN A PERSON'S NAME AS PROPERTY
PLAINTIFF, a manufacturer of baseball bats, had for years utilized the popularity of
famous baseball players for advertising purposes by designing bats of the shapes
preferred by famous players, marking the bats with the players' autographs and
advertising them as "autograph bats," having contracted with the players for the
exclusive privilege to use their names in connection with advertising baseball bats.
Bats of the style preferred by a particular player and sold under his autograph were
known as "Ruth bats" or "Gehrig bats," and thus identified and called for. Defend-
ant, a competing bat manufacturer, copied the styles of the bats made by plaintiff
and labeled its bats in block type, though not in autograph, as "Ruth" or "Gehrig,"
Plaintiff sued to enjoin this use of the names on the ground that it violated plaintiff's
property right to the use of the names, and on the further ground that it con-
stituted unfair competition, since the use of the names falsely implied that the
players had indorsed defendant's bats. The District Court granted the injunction
on both grounds. The Circuit Court of Appeals, refusing to recognize an assignable
property right in a person's name, reversed the decision on the first ground, but al-
lowed a modified injunction on the ground of unfair competition.1
The popularity of a person's name in the public eye, though an interest of great
potential value as an advertising force, was not accorded the status of a property
right protected against appropriation under the common law.2 Thus, a person could
not, in the absence of defamation, or unfair competition, complain of the un-
authorized use of his name, indorsement or likeness for commercial purposes. Never-
theless, the interest of the person himself in the advertising value of his name is
secure against appropriation today in several jurisdictions, for the recent recognition
of the interest of privacy entitles a person to enjoin even the non-defamatory use
of his name for commercial purposes.3 Although a public figure may be said to
1. Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. Sth, 1935)9
cert. denied, U. S. L. Week, Nov. 26, 1935, at 222, col. 3.
2. Clark v. Freeman, 11 Beav. 112 (Rolls. 1848) (physician's endorsement); Dockrell
v. Dougall, 78 L. T. 840 (Q. B. 1898), aff'd, 80 L. T. 556 (Ct. of App. 1899); Olin v. Bate,
98 Ill. 53 (1881). But see Kathreiner's Malzkaffee Fabriken Mit Beschraenkter Haftung v.
Pastor Kneipp Medicine Co., 82 Fed. 321, 325 (C. C. A. 7th, 1897) (name). Contra:
Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 27 Abb. N. C. 402, 18 N. Y. Supp. 240 (Sup. Ct.
1891) (signature).
3. Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905)
(picture); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364 (1909) (endorsement
and picture); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911) (picture); Kunz
v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532 (1918) (picture). New York by statute recognlzc3
the right. N. Y. CiVm RIGnTS LAw (1921) §§ 50, 51. Cf. Edison v. Edison Polyform Co,
73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392 (1907) (same result by property right rationale). For ex-
haustive discussions of the cases, see Kacedan, The Right of Privacy (1932) 12 B. U. L. RMv.
353, 600; Comment (1933) 81 U. or PA. L. REv. 324.
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waive his right to privacy insofar as his activities are news,4 this waiver has not
been extended to the use of his name for advertising purposes.5 Consequently, in
these jurisdictions judicial recognition of a new interest in a popular name as a
property right is not necessary for the protection of the person bearing it.
On the other hand, since the right to privacy is purely personal0 and therefore
cannot be assigned,7 a licensee to whom the bearer of the name has granted its ex-
clusive commercial use cannot invoke this right to restrain the use of the name by
a third party. Nevertheless, the licensee may gain some protection against ap-
propriation of the name by third persons by registering tht name as a trademark,
for a trademark of a person's name will be granted where his consent to its use has
been obtained.8 But the protection thus secured is limited, since it would not pre-
sent such a use of the name as the defendant made in the instant case, that is, a use
in a form different from that trademarked.0 As a second alternative, the licensee
may seek an injunction based on unfair competition, but such relief will be con-
ditioned on a showing either that the licensee has used the name in his advertising
for so long a time that it has developed a secondary meaning to the public, and so
to allow others to use the name would deprive the licensee of business intended for
him,10 or that the use of the name by another would deprive the licensee of business
by falsely implying that the other's product has received the indorsement of the
4. Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S. W. (2d) 972 (1929); Moser v. Press
Publishing Co., 59 Misc. 78, 109 N. Y. Supp. 963 (Sup. CL 190S); Colyer v. Fox Publish-
ing Co., 162 App. Div. 297, 146 N. Y. Supp. 999 (2d Dep't, 1914); Humiston v. Univer-al
Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. Supp. 752 (1st Dep't, 1919) ; see Pavesich v.
New England Mutual Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 204, 50 S. E. 68, 74 (1905); Smith
v. Suratt, 7 Alaska 416 (1926) (polar expedition), noted in (1929) 27 MAcTI. L. Rnv. 353;
Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy (1890) 4 HAv. L. REv. 193, 214.
5. Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51, 103 N. E. 1103 (1913); Blumenthal v. Picture
Classics, Inc., 235 App. Div. 570, 257 N. Y. Supp. 800 (1st Dep't, 1932). See Pel: v.
Tribune Co., 214 U. S. 185, 189 (1909); Pavesich v. New England Mutual Life Insurance
Co., 122 Ga. 190, 199, 50 S. W. 68, 72 (1905); cf. Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189
App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. Supp. 752 (1st Dep't, 1919), noted in (1930) 29 Y,=U L. J. 450.
6. Von Thodorovich v. Franz Josef Beneficial Ass'n, 154 Fed. 911 (C. C. E. D. Pa.
1907); Atkinson v. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285 (1899); Schuyler v.
Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434, 42 N. E. 22 (1895); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171
N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902); Riddle v. MacFadden, 201 N. Y. 215, 94 N. E. 644 (1911) ;
Green, The Right of Privacy (1932) 27 ILr. L. Rnv. 237, 238; cf. Munden v. Harris, 153
Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911); Edison v. Edison Polyform Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67
Atl. 392 (1907).
7. Pekas Co., Inc. v. Leslie, 52 N. Y. L. J. 1864 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1915)) noted in (1915)
28 HARv. L. RLv. 689.
8. National Distilling Co. v. Century Liquor & Cigar Co., 183 Fed. 206 (C. C. A. 6th,
1910); Lambert Pharmacal Co. v. Kalish Pharmacy, 219 Fed. 323 (S. D. N. Y. 1911); M.
B. Tahey Tobacco Co. v. Senior, 252 Fed. 579 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1918); Gillette v. Gillette
Safety Razor Co., 65 F. (2d) 266 (C. C. P. A. 1933).
9. A person's name may not be trademarked unless it is written, printed, impre.sed or
woven in some distinctive manner, or in association with a portrait of the person.
Schlesinger v. Oppenheim Cigar Co., 11 F. (2d) 773 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926). See generally,
Gable, Where and What a Tradernark Protects (1927) 22 Ir. L. Rv. 379.
10. Chickering v. Chickering & Sons, 215 Fed. 490 (C. C. A. 7th, 1914); Vick Medicine
Co. v. Vick Chemical Co., 11 F. (2d) 33 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926); Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm
City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754 (D. Conn. 1935). See generally, Nirss, UnzA Co=-
pxnrox (3rd ed. 1929) ch. 4.
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licensor." If he considered this protection inadequate, the licensee might also re-
quire in his contract a covenant by the licensor that the latter would exercise his
right of privacy and proceed against any unauthorized user of his name. But the
grant of the license might be considered a waiver of the licensor's right to privacy,1
and thus prevent suit by him based on that right.
If the commercial value of a name were -protected as an assignable property in-
terest, the remedy of the licensee would be complete and his process of proof simplified,
,The court in the instant case might have found sufficient basis for recognition of such
an interest. Legal history shows a continual recognition of new interests,1 3 and a
gradual willingness to protect interests in intangible things. Thus, property rights
have been recognized in the word order of letters,14 in architects' plans,16 in ideas
embodied in advertising schemes, 16 and in new inventions. 17 Trademarks and trade-
names, as symbols of the goodwill of a business, and the goodwill itself have been
classified as property' s although they are no less intangible than the publicity value
of a famous name, and some courts, recognizing a property interest in a person's
name, have enjoined the use of the name for commercial purposes.10 Moreover,
the analogy between the goodwill of a business and that attaching to a person's name
persuaded the court in Uproar Company v. National Broadcasting Company20 to hold
that the advertising value of an announcer's name was an assignable property right.
This holding, however, ignored the general rule that a trademark, tradename or the
goodwill of a business cannot be assigned apart from the business in which it is
employed. 21 The motivating reason for this rule is the desire of the courts to prevent
11. Kathreiner's Malzkaffee Fabriken Mit Beschraenketer Haftung v. Pastor Knelpp
Medicine Co., 82 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 7th, 1897).
12. Similarly, the exclusive right to a tradename is lost by permitting its use by others.
Everett 0. Fisk & Co., Inc. v. Fisk Teachers' Agency, Inc. 3 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924).
13. See Warren and Brandeis, supra note 4, at 193-195; Comment (1935) 4 FoRD. L.
REV. 307.
14. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4901, p. 346 (C. C. D. Mass. 1841); Baker v
Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N. E. 109 (1912).
15. Larkin v. Pennsylvania Rr. Co., 125 Misc. 238, 210 N. Y. Supp. 374 (Sup. Ct. 1925),
aff'd without opinion, 216 App. Div. 832, 215 N. Y. Supp. 875 (1st Dep't, 1926).
16. Liggett & Meyer Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 194 N. E. 206 (Ind. App. 1935), noted In
(1935) 44 YALE L. .. 1269.
17. Even unpatented ideas have been protected as property. New Jersey Zinc Co. v.
Singmaster, 4 F. Supp. 967 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
18. Hilson Co. v. Foster, 80 Fed. 896 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1897) (goodwill); Hanover
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 (1916) (trademark); Chapman v. L. E. Water-
man Co., 176 App. Div. 697, 163 N. Y. Supp. 1059, 1069 (1st Dep't, 1917) (goodwill).
See Nnars, UNPAm Cop~mvrrioxr (3rd ed. 1929) § 10.
19. Liebig's Extract of Meat Co. v. Liebig Extract Co., 180 Fed. 688 (C. C. A. 2d,
1910) (name and signature); Edison v. Edison Polyform Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 Atl.
392 (1907) (name and picture); see Kathreiner's Malzkaffee Fabriken Mit Beschraenkter
Haftung v. Pastor Kneipp Medicine Co., 82 Fed. 321, 324 (C. C. A. 7th, 1897). But cf.
Collins v. Simon Ackerman Clothes, Inc., N. Y. L. J., Dec. 18, 1935, at 2489, col. 3 (N,
Y. Sup. Ct.) (consent to use name not a transfer of property justifying issuance of corporate
stock in return therefor).
20. 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934), noted on this topic in (1935) 19 MINN. L. RE. 477;
(1935) 33 MIcH. L. REv. 822. Consult, also, Liebig's Extract of Meat Co. v. Liebig Extract
Co., 180 Fed. 688 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910) (person's name and formula assigned).
21. Everett 0. Fisk Co. v. Fisk Teachers' Agency, Inc., 3 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 8th,
1924), and cases cited. But covenants of a physician not to practice medicine resemble an
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deception and fraud likely to arise either by the use of the trademark or name in a
similar business so as to confuse the source of the product,2 2 or by the use of a
name which connotes personal skill or ability when that skill is not connected with
the present user of the name.23  Accordingly, the sensible rule has been suggested
that an assignable property right be recognized in a trademark, tradename or mere
goodwill where no deception to the public results from that assignment.2  From
this point of view there would be no objection to recognizing an assignable property
right to the players' names in the present case, for the players' skill was employed
in designing the bats and they gave their approval to the product, thus eliminating
any possibility of deception.
PRioRrry or LAND.ORD's LiEN OVER CHATTEL MOMRGAGE
A LANDLORD rented a storeroom to a tenant for a period of five years, rental to
be paid monthly. On the same day the tenant purchased certain fixtures to be used
on the leased premises and gave to the seller a mortgage on them. The lease was
recorded more than a month prior to the moving of the fixtures onto the premises,
but the mortgage was not recorded until a month after the latter event. About
three years later the tenant, owing the landlord the rent for the latter months of
the tenancy and the mortgagee for the balance on the fixtures, went into the hands
of a receiver. In a contest between the chattel mortgagee and the landlord as to
prior rights to the fixtures, a special referee reported that preference was to be
given to the chattel mortgagee. A reversal of this position by the circuit court was
upheld upon appeal to the Supreme Court of South Carolina,' on the ground that
the landlord had a lien, as to all rents accruing under the leasing contract, prior to
the lien of a chattel mortgagee who did not record before the chattels were placed
on the leased premises.
At early common law a landlord, although possessing no actual lien upon his ten-
ant's goods, could distrain any movables found on the premises and hold them until
the rent was paid,2 regardless of whether or not they were the property of the
assignment of goodwill without the transfer of any tangible property. Rowe v. Toon, 185
Iowa 846, 169 N. W. 38 (1918) ; Note (1929) 58 A. L. R. 156.
22. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403, 412, 413 (1916). The addi-
tional reason for the non-assignability of goodwill is that there is nothing to sell, or no
business to which the goodwill may attach. Austin v. Boys, 2 De G. & J. 626 (Ch. 185);
Rossing v. State Bank of Bode, 181 Iowa 1013, 165 N. W. 254 (1917); see Comment (1926)
35 YALE L. J. 496, at 499. Cf. Seuter v. Davis, 38 Cal. 450 (1869).
23. Alaska Packers' Assn. v. Alaska Imp. Co., 60 Fed. 103 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1394)
(trademark); Messrs. v. The Fadettes, 168 Mass. 140, 46 N. E. 407 (1897) (orchetra
tradename); Bailly v. Betti, 241 N. Y. 22, 148 N. E. 776 (1925) (musician); Barrow v.
Marceau, 67 Mfisc. 656, 124 N. Y. Supp. 810 (Sup. Ct. 1910) (photographer); Blakely v.
Sousa, 197 Pa. 305, 47 AUt. 286, 288 (1910) (musician); see Huxie v. Chancy, 143 Mas.
592, 10 N. E. 713 (1887).
24. Comment (1928) 28 Co.. L. Rmv. 353, 356; Comment (1926) 35 Ynt L. J. 496, 502.
1. Francis H. Leggett & Co. v. Orangeburg Piggly Wiggly Co., 176 S. C. 449, 180
S. E. 483 (1935).
2. Jones v. Ford, 254 Fed. 645 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918); Crawford v. Cathey, 143 Ga. 403,
85 S. E. 127 (1915); Commercial Credit Co. v. Vineis, 98 N. J. Law 376, 120 AtI. 417
(1923); Fidelity Trust & Mortgage Co. v. Davis, 158 S. C. 400, 155 S. E. 622 (1930);
1 JoxNs, LAw OF LIs (3d ed. 1914) § 540. The right of a landlord to a licn upon hib
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tenant.L3 But while the rights of the landlord were superior to all mortgagees or
execution creditors as to property found on the leased premises at the time of dis-
traint, a prior levy on a general execution or attachment took priority, 4 since the
lien of a distress warrant dated only from the time of its levy. Later, however,
legislation5 provided that goods upon leased premises could not be taken on execution
unless the party who had obtained the execution had, before the removal of the
goods, paid to the landlord all rents due at the time of the taking of the goods, up
to the amount in arrears for one year's rent. In those states in this country where
the process of distraint is still employed, similar provision is made.0 However,
in many states an actual lien on the chattels of a tenant is given to the landlord by
statute7 This lien, unlike the landlord's right under a distraint which attaches only
from the time of actual seizure,8 attaches at the commencement of the tenancy as
to all goods on the premises at that time, and also attaches to all movables later
brought onto the premises from the time when they are brought there.0 Thus, when
chattels are mortgaged after they have been brought upon leased realty, the prior
rights of the landlord over the chattel mortgagee as to the security of the movables
is clear.10
A troublesome problem arises, however, when, as in the principal case, the contest
for priority is between a landlord and a mortgagee whose mortgage was placed on
the chattels before they were taken upon the leased premises. Although it may
seem that in such a case the seller would uniformly have prior rights as against the
landlord, the cases holding this view are far in the minority."1 The large majority
have held that even though a mortgage is executed prior to the placing of the chat-
els upon the leased premises, unless the vendor also duly records the mortgage before
that time, it will not take priority over the landlord's right to the chattels as
security.' 2 The necessity for timely recordation has been justified as a protection
to bona fide subsequent creditors against the danger of being misled into extending
credit to a debtor with a secret lien on his property. 13 But, actually, in most cases it
would seem to be doubtful that lessors when executing leases place much reliance on
tenants' goods is regarded as an aid to tenants in securing extensions of credit. 1 JoNas,
supra, § 540.
3. In re West Side Paper Co., 162 Fed. 110 (C. C. A. 3d, 1908); Swartz v. Gottlieb-
Bauern-Schnidt-Straus Brewing Co., 109 Md. 393, 71 Atl. 854 (1909).
4. See (1935) 3 Duxa B. Ass'x J. 27.
5. 8 Anne c. 16 (1709).
6. 1 JoNss, op. cit. supra note 2, § 552.
7. See 1 Jo wEs, op. cit. supra note 2, § 540. A lien may also be expressly reserved In the
leasing contract.
8. Morgan v. Campbell, 89 U. S. 381 (1874); 1 JoNs, op. cit. supra note 2, § 551.
9. Fowler v. Rapley, 15 Wall. 328 (U. S. 1872); Beall v. White, 94 U. S. 382 (1876);
1 JoNES, op. cit. supra note 2, § 555.
10. Gilbert v. Greenbaum, 56 Iowa 211, 9 N; W. 182 (1881); Austin v. Welch, 31 Tex.
Civ. App. 526, 72 S. W. 881 (1903); Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. Sherman Hotel Co., 81
Tex, 135, 16 S. W. 807 (1891).
11. Davis Gasoline Engine Works Co. v. McHugh, 115 Iowa 415, 88 N. W. 948 (1902);
Amundson v. Standard Printing and Mfg. Co., 140 Iowa 464, 118 N. W. 789 (1908);
Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Murphy, 89 Miss. 264, 42 So. 288 (1906).
12. Manhattan Trust Co. v. Sioux City & N. Ry. Co., 68 Fed. 72 (N. D. Iowa 1895);
Thorpe v. Fowler, 57 Iowa 541, 11 N. W. 3 (1881); Rand v. Barrett, 66 Iowa 731, 24 N. W.
530 (1885); Perry v. Waggoner, 68 Iowa 403, 27 N. W. 292 (1886).
13. Ransom & Randolph Co. v. Moore, 272 Mich. 31, 261 N. IV. 128 (1935); United
States Hoffman Machinery Co. v. Harris, 167 S. C. 443, 166 S. E. 613 (1932).
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their liens on the chattels of their tenants, particularly when the chattels in ques-
tion are purchased after the tenancy is begun. Thus, it might be contended that
priority of the landlord's lien over that of the unrecorded chattel mortgage should
be allowed only when it is shown that reliance had actually been placed by the lessor
on the clear title of the tenant to his goods.' 4 But this would necessitate a trial
of the issue in every instance. Or, it has been suggested that the landlord's lien
should be allowed to take precedence over a chattel mortgage only as to unpaid rent
accruing prior to the actual recordation of the mortgage.'8 The objection here,
however, is that if the landlord in executing the lease relied upon the tenant's
chattels as security, his priority should be recognized as to the total rent, since the
lease is an entirety.' 6
It is, of course, obvious that both lines of argument involve the application of
patent fictions, for the doctrine that the landlord relies on the clear title of the
tenant to his chattels is as fictitious as the doctrine that the landlord is given notice
by the recording of the chattel mortgage. It therefore seems unimportant what rule
is followed, so long as the duties required of a chattel mortgagee in the protection
of his interests are dear. It is apparent that under the majority rule the only way
in which a chattel mortgagee can adequately protect himself against a landlord's
lien is by the immediate recordation of his mortgage. But, since a chattel mortgagee
has anyway to record his mortgage with due diligence if he wishes to protect his
interests as against subsequent bona fide purchasers, mortgagees, and judgment cred-
itors of the tenant-mortgagor,' 7 this involves no undue burden. Moreover, the appli-
cation of the strict rule adopted by the court in the instant case has the merit of
bringing certainty to a vexing problem.
ASSIGNABiLITY OF THE CoRPoRATE CAUSE or ACTION AGAINST DrnucroRs Prt FnAUD
MINorITY stockholders brought a representative suit against the directors of a
corporation for fraud, mismanagement, and misappropriation of the corporate prop-
erty. Subsequently, and pursuant to a plan adopted by the directors and ratified by
the majority stockholders, a sale and conveyance of all the assets to another corpora-
tion was effected. In an amended answer, the defendants and the new corporation,
which was permitted to intervene, interposed this conveyance as a plea in bar, con-
tending that the cause of action set forth in the plaintiffs' bill had vested in the new
corporation which alone, by its directors and stockholders, had the right to further
prosecute the action. On appeal from tie dismissal of the original bill, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed on the ground that the cause of action was
not assignable by the corporation because it did not constitute a claim for damages
to specific property, but was simply a right to litigate for a fraud practiced on the
corporation.'
14. See Davis Gasoline Engine Works Co. v. McHugh, 115 Iowa 415, 88 N. W. 948
(1902).
15. (1935) 49 HsAv. L. REv. 144; also see (1935) 3 Dun B. Ass'z" J. 27.
16. Leasing contracts are generally construed as entire. Spilmen v. Geiger, 58 F. (2d)
890 (C. C. A. D. C., 1932); Martin v. Stearns, 52 Iowa 345, 3 N. W. 92 (1879); PepSi-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Indian Rock Bottling Co., 98 W. Va. 269, 126 S. E. 715 (1925).
17. See Note (1934) 18 MRNN. L. REv. 812.
1. Baker v. Allen, 197 N. E. 521 (Mass. 1935). See also United Zinc Companies v.
Harwood, 216 Mass. 474, 103 N. E. 1037 (1914); American Woolen Co. v. Old Colony
Trust Co., 263 Mass. 321, 160 N. E. 816 (1928).
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No difficulty from a legal standpoint should, seemingly, be experienced by courts
in holding a cause of action against directors for fraud assignable, The relationship
between the directors and the corporation has, traditionally, been envisaged as one
of trust.2  The mismanagement of the corporation, therefore, renders the directors
liable for breach of fiduciary obligation, and, consequently, the action against them
may properly be characterized as one ex contractu in nature rather than ex delicto'
Secondly, there can, realistically, be no personal injury to the corporation, as distinct
from injury to the property of the corporation, ensuing from the acts of the direc-
tors.4 Thirdly, it is recognized that the right of action for fraud survives against
representatives of deceased directors;5 and the attributes of survivability and assign-
ability of a cause of action are generally considered interchangeable. 0 Moreover,
there are recurring situations in which the action is denominated an asset of the
corporation and treated as freely alienable. Courts have evinced no hesitancy in
holding that it passes to and vests in a trustee in bankruptcy, 7 a receiver,8 and an
assignee under a general assignment for the benefit of creditors.0 Such representa-
tives may dispose of the claim together with the other assets,' 0 or may effect a
settlement of it provided good faith is exercised and adequate consideration is ob-
tained."
No good reason appears why a different treatment should be accorded the cause
of action when the question of its assignability arises in the situation of the present
case, namely, where the wronged corporation effects a voluntary conveyance of all
its assets to another corporation. Since the right to reparation for the misfeasance
of the directors has always been deemed a corporate right in contradistinction to a
2. 3 Coox, CoazoRATioNs (8th ed. 1923) § 648.
3. See Bates v. Dresser, 229 Fed. 772, 798 (D. Mass. 1915); First National Bank of
Fairmont v. Smith, 85 W. Va. 624, 629, 103 S. E. 318, 321 (1920); cf. Colcord v. Granzow,
137 Okla. 194, 278 Pac. 654 (1929); Weston v. Dahl, 162 Wis. 32, 155 N. W. 949 (1916).
4. A cause of action is deemed assignable if it directly or indirectly affects property
rights. Shultz v. Christman, 6 Mo. App. 338 (1878); Houston v. Wilhite, 224 Mo. App.
695, 27 S. W. (2d) 772 (1930) ; (1935) 44 YAL L. J. 530, 532 and cases cited. Moreover,
since the fraud practiced by the directors ordinarily involves elements of wrongful reten-
tion and misappropriation of the corporate property, the action, to that extent, may be
analogized to one in conversion which has long been held assignable. Jordan v. Gillen,
44 N. H. 424 (1862); McKee v. Judd, 12 N. Y. 622 (1855).
5. Bates v. Dresser, 229 Fed. 772 (D. Mass. 1915); Von Arnim v. American Tube Works,
188 Mass. 515, 74 N. E. 680 (1905).
6. See Sperry v. Stennick, 64 Ore. 96, 102, 129 Pac. 130, 132 (1913); Myers, Inc. v
Ogden Shoe Co., 173 Wis. 317, 320, 181 N. W. 306, 307 (1921).
7. Farmer v. Brooks, 213 Ala. 137, 104 So. 322 (1925); Putnam v. Handy, 247 Mass
406, 142 N. E. 77 (1924); Stephan v. Merchants Collateral Corp., 256 N. Y. 418, 176 N
E. 824 (1931).
8. Kelly v. Dolan, 233 Fed. 635 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916); Klein v. Peter, 284 Fed. 797 (C
C. A. 8th, 1922) ; see Comment (1934) 14 B. U. L. REv. 802.
9. Shultz v. Christman, 6 Mo. App. 338 (1878).
10. Houghton v. Enslen, 261 Fed. 113 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919); Baker v. Sutton, 47 Ga
App. 176, 170 S. E. 95 (1933); Craig v. James, 71 App. Div. 238, 75 N. Y. Supp. 813
(1st Dep't, 1902).
11. People v. Anglo-American Savings and Loan Ass'n, 66 App. Div. 9, 72 N. Y. Supp.
1021 (2d Dep't, 1901), aff'd, 169 N. Y. 606, 62 N. E. 1099 (1902) memo decision; Craig v.
James, 89 App. Div. 541, 85 N. Y. Supp. 583 (1st Dep't, 1904), aff'd, 181 N. Y. 538, 73 N.
E. 1121 (1905) memo decision; cf. Hackley v. Draper, 60 N. Y. 88 (1875).
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right inuring to the individual stockholders,12 it would seem that the corporation
should have the power to dispose of it.13 The existence of this power is manifestly
desirable, for example, in the usual case of a merger or consolidation. Since the new
corporation generally succeeds to all the contingent liabilities of the old corpora-
tions,' 4 there seems to be good reason for allowing it to enjoy the benefits of all con-
tingent rights.15 The denial of assignability in such a case would engender un-
necessary procedural difficulties in the enforcement of the claims against the direc-
tors, especially where their fraudulent mismanagement is detected only subsequent
to the dissolution of the wronged corporation, which, as continuing owner of the
cause of action in legal contemplation, would be a necessary party to the maintenance
of the suit.16
The court in the principal case may have been confronted with the consideration
that to permit free alienability of the right of action in all cases would provide a
convenient device by which directors might escape the consequences of their own
fraud and thus prejudice the rights of the minority stockholders.' 7 But the injured
stockholders will not, as a necessary result, be left without an adequate remedy. If
the property of the old corporation is exchanged for stock in the new corporation to
be distributed to the individual stockholders, the latter, in their status as shareholders
of the new corporation, will be able to prosecute the action as effectively as previous
to the transfer. Similarly, where the stock of the new corporation is retained by the
old corporation in a holding company arrangement, the injured stockholders can
institute the representative suit on behalf of the newly formed subsidiary company.' 8
A more difficult problem is, indeed, presented when the assets are sold for cash to a
new or a competitor corporation. Holding that the cause of action has thereby been
effectively assigned would necessarily bar the injured stockholders from maintaining
the corporate suit, since they are strangers to the corporation now possessing it.
But even in such a case, the stockholders are not denied a fair opportunity to have
their wrongs redressed, since upon a showing of fraud or lack of consideration they
may avoid the entire transaction.'0 Nor would the ratification of the transfer by a
majority of the stockholders, controlled by the directors, operate to prejudice the
minority stockholders' rights. Although courts will not review the expediency of a
12. See generally, BAL.LANTnmx, ,mA. or CoRPomtrro:; I A , P, crx (1930) §
185, § 188.
13. In a number of cases involving banking corporations a general transfer of all the
assets has been held to include a cause of action against directors. Buck v. Gimon, 201
Ala. 619, 79 So. 51 (1918); Hicks v. Steel, 142 Mich. 292, 105 N. W. 767 (1905); The
Grocers' National Bank of New York v. Clark, 4S Barb. 26 (N. Y. 1866); First National
Bank of Fairmont v. Smith, 85 W. Va. 624, 103 S. E. 318 (1920).
14. BA.LANTxnE, op. cit. supra note 12, § 245.
15. See id. § 244.
16. In the absence of a statute, a dissolved corporation can neither sue nor he sued,
and actions commenced prior to dissolution are abated. BAL-;,,rm, op. cit. supra
note 12, § 268. This result is largely obviated by statutes which purport to continue the
life of the corporation for certain purposes. 16 FLEH, Cyca0Pmora op iT M ,w or
Parv.xv CORPORAT0.IOS (1933) § 8143. For discussion of some of the problems, sEe Com-
ment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1031.
17. Such an attempt seems to have been made in the case of United Zinc Compantes
v. Harwood, 216 Mass. 474, 103 N. E. 1037 (1914).
18. Holmes v. Camp, 1S0 App. Div. 409, 167 N. Y. Supp. 840 (Ist Dep't, 1917);
BAxr n'an, op. cit. supra note 12, § 136.
19. 3 Coon, op. cit. supra note 2, § 662.
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sale of all the corporate assets, when approved by the majority, they will intervene to
prevent or redress wrongs effected by that means.2 0
WIFE'S ACTION AGAINST HUSBAND's PARTNER FOR TORT OF HUSBAND IN PARTNER-
SHIP BUSINESS
AT common law the fiction prevailed that in marriage the persons of husband and
wife became merged so that neither could maintain an action against the other.
While this rule has been relaxed by statutes permitting a wife to sue as if she were
unmarried,1 it still prevails in many jurisdictions to the extent that neither husband
nor wife may sue the other for personal injuries.2 Under this latter rule there has
been a wide split of authority on the question whether a wife may maintain an action
against her husband's employer or principal for an injury inflicted on her through
-the negligence of her husband while acting in the scope of his employment or agency.
Some courts hold flatly that since the husband is not liable to his wife for such an
injury, his master or principal cannot be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.3 In Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co.4 the New York Court of Appeals
led the way in enunciating the opposite view. The court in that case drew a dis-
tinction between liability and culpability, holding that although the husband is
immune from liability, his negligent act is nevertheless unlawful, and that his master
is liable on the basis of the illegality of the servant's act, irrespective of whether
the servant can be forced to respond in damages to the injured party. The court re-
garded the rule that a wife cannot sue her husband in tort as an exception engrafted
by tradition upon the statutory provision that a married woman may sue as if un-
married, and refused to extend the scope of this exceptional disability.
20. Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590 (1921); Nave-McCord
Mercantile Co. v. Ranney, 29 F. (2d) 383 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928); Godley v. Crandall &
Godley Co., 212 N. Y. 121, 105 N. E. 818 (1914); Rom cir, LAW AND PRACTICE nz CoiPOR-
ATE CONTROL (1933) 130.
1. N. Y. Dom. Rm. LAW (1909) § 57.
2. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611 (1910), 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1153 (1911);
Schultz v. Schultz, 89 N. Y. 644 (1882); Allen v. Allen, 246 N. Y. 571, 159 N. E. 656
(1927). The usual reason now given for denying the right of suit between spouses for
torts is that to allow such suits would contravene public policy by fomenting marital
discord.
3. Maine v. James Maine & Sons Co., 198 Iowa 1278, 201 N. W. 20 (1924); Sacknoff
v. Sacknoff, 131 Me. 280, 161 AtI. 669 (1932); Riser v. Riser, 240 Mich. 402, 215 N. IV.
290 (1927); Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N. W. 297
(1927); Rainds v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415, 55 S. W. (2d) 263 (1932). The disability of an
unemancipated minor to sue his parent in tort has led to the similar result that a child
has no cause of action against his father's employer for the tort of his father, committed
in the scope of his employment. Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 269 Ill. App. 164 (1933).
4. 249 N. Y. 253, 164 N. E. 42 (1929). This view has since been adopted in several
other jurisdictions. Webster v. Snyder, 103 Fla. 1131, 138 So. 755 (1932); McLaurin v.
McLaurin Furniture Co., 166 Miss. 180, 146 So. 877 (1933) (recovery denied on ground
that wife was not invitee of employer); Cerruti v. Simone, 13 N. J. Misc. 466, 179 Atl,
257 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Huff, 48 Ohio App. 412, 194
N. E. 429 (1933), rev'd on other grounds, 128 Ohio St. 469, 191 N. E. 761 (1934); Poulin
v. Graham, 102 Vt. 307, 147 Atl. 698 (1929); Hensel v. Hensel Yellow Cab Co., 209 Wis.
489, 245 N. W. 159 (1932); see 1 RE STATE ENT, ArEcy (1933) § 217. Recovery has also
A recent New York case raises the question as to who, if anyone, is liable to a
wife injured through her husband's negligent operation of an automobile in the
scope of the business of a partnership of which he is a member. The wife brought
suit against her husband and his partner individually and as copartners. The court
dismissed the complaint, holding that the wife had no cause of action either against
her husband individually or as a partner, or against the partnership, or against her
husband's partner individually.5
Clearly, under the rule forbidding tort suits between spouses, a wife may not sue
her husband directly for injuries caused by him. Nor may she sue him as a partner
on the strained theory urged in the instant case, that as a partner he is a principal
responsible for the acts of an agent who has caused her injury. For, the acts of an
agent are deemed to be those of his principal, and the husband would no more be
liable for commission of the tort as principal, than he would as agent.0 Accordingly,
under no theory could the husband be held liable here. Nor may the partnership
be held liable as an entity, since in tort suits, at least, it is universally held that the
partnership is not a separate entity, apart from the partners who compose it. And
the partners cannot be held jointly liable, because such liability is conditional upon a
right of action against all the partners, and here the husband cannot be joined as
defendant. 7
The action against the husband's partner on the basis of his several liability as a
member of the firm, however, involves different considerations.8 In the light of the
Schubert case, it is apparently settled in New York that, had the injury to the
plaintiff been caused by her husband acting as an agent of a partnership of which
he was not a member, the partners would be individually liable, and the joining of
all the partners as defendants would not be necessary.0 The question is, then, should
a different rule obtain where the husband is, in a sense, both agent and partner.
Section 4 of the Partnership Act provides that the law of agency shall be applicable
to that of partnership;'L and it is generally held that each partner acts, within the
scope of the partnership business, as an agent of every other partner." Hence, it
would seem to follow from the Schubert case that the other partners may be held
been allowed by a child against his father's employer for the tort of his father. Chase v.
New Haven Waste Material Corp., 111 Conn. 377, 150 At. 107 (1930).
5. Caplan v. Caplan, 268 N. Y. 445, 198 N. E. 23 (1935).
6. Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15 P. (2d) 922 (1932).
7. David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 157 AUt. 755 (1932); Wadsworth v. Webster, 237 App.
Div. 319, 261 N. Y. Supp. 670 (1932); Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 15 Tenn. App. 570 (1932)
(suit by child against father's partnership for tort of father). Recovery against the
partnership has been allowed in a jurisdiction which allows a wife to sue her husband
directly for personal injuries. Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N. W. 475, 210 N. W. 822
(1926).
8. The only other case in which this precise question has been presented held, in accord
with the instant case, that a child could not recover from his father's partner for the tort
of his father. Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Blinn. 537, 242 N. W. 1 (1932). However, it does
not appear that Minnesota adheres to the doctrine of the Schubert case.
9. Roberts v. Johnson, 58 N. Y. 613 (1874); Matter of Peck, 206 N. Y. 5, 99 N. E.
258 (1912). Likewise, an action for a tort of one of the partners may be brought against
any one of the partners. Kavanaugh v. McIntyre, 210 N. Y. 175, 104 N. E. 135 (1914),
aff'd, 242 U. S. 138 (1916); Roux v. Lawand, 131 Mle. 215, 160 Aft. 756 (1932); In re
Seybel's Will, 124 N. Y. Misc. 297, 207 N. Y. Supp. 765 (Surr. Ct. 1925); Boston Foundry
Co. v. Whiteman, 31 R. I. 88, 76 At. 757 (1910).
10. N. Y. PARTNmsmp LAw (1919) § 4, par. 3.
11. See First Nat. Bank v. Farson, 226 N. Y. 218, 221-2, 123 N. E. 490, 491 (1919).
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liable for the acts of one of the partneis acting as their agent, regardless of whether
the latter enjoys a personal immunity from suit.
The objection that the husband's partner, if held liable, might ultimately recover
over from the husband by way of contribution is no more cogent than the similar
objection, which was held immaterial in the Schubert case, that a principal might
recover over against his agent. For, in either case the recovery over need not be
based on any theory of subrogation to the wife's cause of action, thus accomplishing
an indirect suit against the husband, but may be based, rather, upon the breach of
an independent duty owing to the principal or partner.12 And the consideration that
a recovery over might be more likely in point of fact against a partner than against
an agent or servant, while it may diminish the practical value to the plaintiff of such
a suit as the instant one, is of no legal consequence as affecting her cause of action
against her husband's partner.
But the court here was impressed by the fact that it seemed unfair to hold one
partner liable while the other who committed the wrong was immune, ignoring the
fact that for nearly two centuries the plaintiff in a tort case has been permitted to
sue one or another partner wholly at his discretion.' 3 As technical support for its
position, the court invoked the provision of the Partnership Law that the partners
shall be jointly and severally liable for the tortious acts of a partner in the course
of the partnership business "to the same extent as the partner so acting."'14 From
this provision it was held to follow that, since the husband is not liable to his
wife, his partner could 'not be held liable. A literal interpretation of the act justi-
fies such a conclusion. 15 But the conclusion of the court is not a necessary one, for
the provision of the act may be interpreted, not as a limitation upon the liability
of the partnership and its members, but as giving to the injured person a right of
action against the partnership and the partners individually as well as against the
partner who inflicted the injury. In support of this interpretation of the provision as
a protection to an injured party, rather than to the partners, is the fact that the
liability of the partners for the wrongful acts or breach of trust of a partner is made
joint and several, while for other debts and obligations of the firm the liability is
only joint.16 It is at least arguable that the framers of the act did not intend to let
off the other partners merely because a partner who has committed a wrong is per-
sonally immune from liability. The gist of the wife's action is the wrongful act of
her husband acting as the agent of his partner, and the unlawfulness of the act re-
mains as the basis of an action against the partner although there is no direct remedy
against the husband. Such an interpretation would seem to carry out the more
modern policy expressed in the Schubert case as to actions between spouses,' 7 and
would thus seem to lead to a better result.
12. See Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 253, 257, 164 N. E. 42, 43 (1929);
M acHE, ELEMENTS OF r=x LAW oF PaRTaNRsEUP (2d. ed. 1920) § 173.
13. Rice v. Shute, 5 Burr. 2611, 98 Eng. Rep. 374 (K. B. 1770).
14. N. Y. PARiNR'smp LAW (1919) §§ 24, 26.
15. This interpretation of the words of the Partnership Act as an exact measure of the
liability of the other partners would also seem to indicate that the other partners might
be held vicariously liable even for punitive damages assessed against a partner for an
act done as their agent in the course of the business. Such a result, however, has been
disapproved in the law of agency. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Aldridge, 66 F. (2d)
26 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933).
16. N. Y. PARNFmsu' LAW (1919) § 26.
17. In some jurisdictions the married women's statutes have been construed to permit
actions for tort between spouses. Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917);
Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Ati. 889 (1914); Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N. H. 4, 95
At]. 657 (1915); Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124, 140 Pac. 1022 (1914).
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PRoo OF CLArm ix BANKRUPTCY BY CREDITOR HOLDInG SECURITY O PnoPErTY
TRANSFERRED BY BANKRUPT To THmD PAreTY
In a recent case,' A (a corporation) had acquired property subject to a mortgage
which it expressly assumed and agreed to pay. Thereafter, it transferred the property
thus encumbered to T, A remaining liable on the mortgage debt. Subsequently, the
mortgagee foreclosed on the property in the possession of T, obtaining it for a nomi-
nal bid-in sum of $100. Meanwhile, A had been adjudicated a bankrupt, and the
mortgagee, although admitting that the property foreclosed was reasonably worth
$9000, filed its claim against the bankrupt estate for the full amount of the debt,
less the $100. Affirming a decision below, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit2 held that, since the mortgagee's security was on property of a party other
than the bankrupt, it was not a "secured creditor" within the meaning of Section 57e
of the Bankruptcy Act,3 which requires a "secured creditor" to deduct the value of his
security from the amount of his claim against the bankrupt estate.4 But it never-
theless required the creditor to deduct the $9000 admitted value of the security, thus
reaching the same result as that contemplated by Section 57e, on the theory that the
mortgagee "equitably owed" the bankrupt the value of the security and therefore
came under Section 68a, which provides that debts and credits between creditor and
bankrupt shall be set off against each other and the balance only paid.5 On appeal,
the United States Supreme Court reversed, agreeing with the lower court that Sec-
tion 57e was inapplicable, but denying the applicability of Section 68a on the ground
that the line of reasoning adopted below rested on the untenable proposition that any
creditor who realizes on his security "owes" his debtor the amount realized.0
1. Ivanhoe Building & Loan Ass'n. of Newark, N. J. v. Orr, 55 Sup. Ct. 6S5 (1935).
2. Ivanhoe Building & Loan Ass'n. of Newark, N. 3. v. Orr, 73 F. (2d) 609 (C. C. A.
3d, 1934).
3. 30 STAT. 560 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 93e (1927). "Claims of secured creditor.
shall be allowed for such sums only as to the courts seems to be owing over and above the
value of their securities...."
4. This "bankruptcy rule," which requires the secured creditor to deduct the value of
his security except where his security is against a third person or his property, is to be
contrasted with the "chancery rule," which allows proof by secured creditors of their claims
in full, irrespective of the person or property against whom the security is held. See Merrill
v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U. S. 131 (1899), L. R. A. 1918B, 1031; Chemical
National Bank v. Armstrong, 59 Fed. 372 (C. C. A. 6th, 1S93); (1931) 19 Civxur. L. Rt,.
638; (1933) 20 VA. L. RLv. 234. Outside of bankruptcy proceedings the federal courts apply
the chancery rule, Merrill v. National Bank, supra; and the weight of authority in the
state courts favors the chancery rule. See, e.g., People v. Remington, 121 N. Y. 328 (1390),
(upholding chancery rule). Contra: Amory v. Francis, 16 Mass. 303 (1820), (upholding
bankruptcy rule). There is a growing trend by way of state legislative enactment toward the
use of the bankruptcy rule in state liquidation proceedings. L. R. A. 1918B, 1031. In England
the bankruptcy rule is by statute made applicable to all insolvency proceedings. Juroxcnxrz
Act, 36 & 37 VicT. c. 66, § 25 (1873); Cow..,rzs Acr, 19 & 20 GEo. V, c. 23, § 262 (1929).
Without the aid of statute, the bankruptcy rule was originally applied in England to in-
solvency proceedings outside of bankruptcy. Greenwood v. Taylor, 1 Russ. & M. 1S, 39
Eng. Rep. 72 (1830). But beginning with Mason v. Bogg, 2 M.yl. & Cr. 443, 40 Eng. Rcp.
709 (1837), upheld in Kellock's Case, L. R. 3 Ch. App. 769 (186S), the chanccry rulb
continued to be the law of England outside of bankruptcy proceedings until the JunieaTtrrm
AcT, supra.
5. 30 STAT. 565 (189S), 11 U. S. C. A. § lKSa (1927).
6. Although in any event the creditor will not be allowed to obtain bankruptcy divi-
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That Section 68a was not designed to cover the situation where a creditor has real-
ized on his security is clear.7 Furthermore, there appears to be ample legal justifica-
tion for the instant decision insofar as it rests on the additional proposition that the
mortgagee was not a "secured creditor" within the meaning of Section 57e and there-
fore not required to deduct the value of its security from its claim in bankruptcy.
For, Section 1(23) of the Act defines a "secured creditor" as one holding security on
the property of the bankrupt.8 Thus, since the mortgagee in the instant case held
security on property of the bankrupt's grantee, and not on the property of the bank-
rupt, Section 57e was inapplicable.9 Similarly, it has been held inapplicable where
the creditor's claim is secured by a third party endorser, surety, or guarantor;10 or
where the creditor's claim against the bankrupt is by virtue of the bankrupt's liability
as endorser, surety, or guarantor for the debt of a third party, even though in addi-
tion the creditor is secured by the principal debtor.'1 Likewise, even where the bank-
rupt and the third party are respectively a partnership and one of the individual part-
ners, the fact that the creditor holds security on the property of the individual partner
will not prevent proof of his claim in full against the partnership assets, since the
individual partner's assets are applied first in satisfaction of his personal debts before
becoming subject to partnership claims.' 2 And the result is the same in all these
cases whether the creditor is able to realize upon his security against the third party
or has actually realized after bankruptcy; in either case he is not required by Sec-
tion 57e to deduct the value of the security from his claim in bankruptcy. 13
dends, which would, when added to the value of his security, more than. equal the face
amount of the debt owing to him, nevertheless the amount of the claim he is allowed to
prove is highly important, since it is the basis upon which the dividends are calculated
pro rata. GLs=iN, LIQUIDATIONS § 528.
7. Lehigh Valley Coal Sales Co. v. Maguire, 251 Fed. 581 (C. C. A. 7th, 1918), holding
that the set-off clause of the Bankruptcy Act does not enlarge or change, but merely recog-
nizes, what under general law may constitute set-offs.
8. 30 STAT. 545 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 1(23) (1927) ". . . secured creditor shall in-
clude a creditor who has security for his debt upon the property of the bankrupt of a nature
to be assignable under this title, or who owns such a debt for which some indorser, surety,
or other persons secondarily liable for the bankrupt has such security upon the bankrupt's
assets."
9. 2 CoLLm, BANxRUPrcY (13th ed. 1923) 1144; 2 REMINGTON, BANKRUPT Y (3d ed. 1923)
306.
10. Swarts v. 4th National Bank of St. Louis, 117 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902); In re
Noyes Bros., 127 Fed. 286 (C. C. A. 1st, 1903); Young v. Gordon, 219 Fed. 168 (C. C. A.
4th, 1914); In re New York Commercial Co., 233 Fed. 906 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916); In re 11
V. Keep Shirt Co., 200 Fed. 80 (E. D. N. Y. 1912); In re Pan-American Match Co., 242
Fed. 995 (D. Mass. 1917).
11. Gorman v. Wright, 136 Fed. 164 (C. C. A. 4th, 1905); Board of Commissioners v.
Hurley et al., 169 Fed. 92 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909); In re Keenan, 15 F. (2d) 1006 (C. C. A.
7th, 1926); Bankers Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 73 F. (2d) 296 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934);
In re Thompson,. 208 Fed. 207 (E. D. N. Y. 1913); In re Adair Realty & Trust Co., 35 F.
(.2d) 531 (N. D. Ga. 1929).
Of these cases, together with the cases cited in Note 10, supra, half were reversals of deci-
sions rendered below, indicating a reluctance in some instances on the part of referees and
district courts to recognize the distinction between security on the property of the bankrupt
and security on the property of a third party. The holdings have been uniform, however,
upon final adjudication.
12. Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206 U. S. 28 (1906); Hampel et al. v. Minkwitz, 18 F. (2d)
3 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927); Mitchel v. Hampel, 276 U. S. 299 (1928).
13. So, a creditor may prove his claim in full when it is predicated on a judgment
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This distinction in result between the cases where the creditor's security is against
a third party and where it is on the bankrupt's property has been justified by the
courts on grounds of policy, as well as on the technical wording of the statute. Thus,
it is reasoned in the case where the security is on the property of the bankrupt, and
where Section 57e is therefore applicable, that, to the extent of the creditor's security
on the assets of the bankrupt, the assets remaining to satisfy other creditors are de-
pleted. To allow the creditor to realize on this security and in addition to prove on
his entire claim would, it is believed, prejudice the other creditors of the bankrupt
and give the secured creditor more than that for which he bargained. But where a
creditor is secured by a third party, or his property, it is reasoned that be has bar-
gained for and obtained two rights-one against the third party or his property, the
other against the bankrupt. Thus, since the fact that he is able to, or does, realize on
the security does not in any way diminish the amount of the bankrupt's assets avail-
able to the other creditors, it is held that he should not be required to deduct the
value of his security from the amount of his claim.
14
But while there is thus apparent justification for holding Section 57e inapplicable
to the instant case, and allowing the mortgagee to prove his full claim in bankruptcy
without deduction for the value of the security realized upon, the result seems un-
fortunate. For, had title to the mortgaged property remained in the debtor until
the time of bankruptcy, the mortgagee would, under Section 57e, have had to deduct
the value of the security from the amount of the claim in bankruptcy, since he would
be a "secured creditor" within the meaning of the Act, his security being "upon the
property of the bankrupt." Yet, although neither the mortgagee nor any other party
has done anything to justify the mortgagee's receiving a better treatment where the
mortgaged land has been transferred to a third party before bankruptcy of the debtor,
Section 57e is nevertheless held inapplicable. Furthermore, the mortgagee's realiza-
tion, or ability to realize, upon his security in the latter situation is no less a prejudice
to the other creditors of the bankrupt, justifying the requirement that the secured
creditor deduct the value of his security from his bankruptcy claim, than in the former
case. Thus, so far as the other creditors are concerned, the value of the property is
just as much assets of the debtor, offsetting his liability on the mortgage debt, in the
case where the debtor holds title to the property, as in the case where he has trans-
ferred subject to the encumbrance. In both cases, the property is the primary
fund out of the proceeds of which the mortgage debt may be expected to be Pid.21
It may be argued, in answer to these objections, that, just as the existent language
of the Act makes possible an undeserved preferential treatment of the secured credi-
tor in the instant situation, it may ad likely prove a windfall to the other creditors
against the bankrupt, although the judgment also runs against a co-defendant from whom
partial satisfaction has been had, In re Headley, 97 Fed. 765 (W. D. 1899); and a creditor
whose debtor makes a new °promise to pay an old debt from which the debtor has been
discharged in bankruptcy may still prove in full against the bankrupt estate on the old debt
in spite of partial satisfaction obtained on the new, since it is said that the creditor's right
against the discharged bankrupt, by virtue of the new promise, is in effect a right against a
third party whose assets form no part of the bankrupt estate, and that such satisfaction cannot
affect the distributive shares of the other creditors of the estate, In re Swecteer, 128 Fed.
165 (D. Mass. 1904).
14. See Notes 10, 11, 12, 13, supra, and cases cited therein.
15. 2 JoN-zs, MORTGAGES (Sth ed. 1928) §§ 839, 911, 917, 920, 939, 964, 967. Of course,
where the grantee takes under a warranty deed, the grantor having agreed to pay off the
mortgage this would not apply. But the argument in the text, based on the facts of the




at the expense of the mortgagee. Thus, conversely to the instant situation, the nort-
gage security might originally have been on the property of the third party (in which
case Section 57e would not have been applicable had the debtor then become bank-
rupt), and the mortgaged property thereafter transferred to the debtor, thus render-
ing Section 57e applicable, although the mortgagee had done nothing to deserve the
change in treatment. It is submitted, however, that this argument only brings out
more clearly the fact that the existent wording of the Act makes possible a treatment
of the mortgage creditor, and thus of the other unsecured creditors of the bankrupt,
which is wholly fortuitous and unrelated to the purported policy behind Section 57e.
The instant case presents only one of the situations in which the Act's limitation
of the meaning of secured creditor to one holding security on the property of the
bankrupt seems to work a result opposed to its purpose of effecting equality of treat-
ment among creditors. A similar situation arises where, although the creditor has
realized, or is able to realize, against a principal debtor, he is nevertheless allowed to
claim in full against the estate of a bankrupt endorser, surety, or guarantor, since he
is not a secured creditor within the meaning of the Act, his security being against the
principal, a third party. Yet, it seems clear in this case that the assets of the prin-
cipal were intended by all the parties to be the primary fund for the satisfaction
of the debt, the surety, endorser, or guarantor being intended to stand liable only in
case of, and to the extent of the principal's default. Furthermore, it has been sug-
gested that, in any case, to give a secured creditor preferential treatment merely be-
cause his security is against a third party or his property, rather than on property of
the bankrupt, lacks sufficient justification; so that the rule of Section 57e ought to be
extended to all secured creditors.'( But even if it is not deemed wise thus far to
extend the definition of "secured creditor" in the Bankruptcy Act, the instant case
once more demonstrates the need for amending the definition of "secured creditor"
to include the case where the security is upon property, which, although not property
of the debtor assignable to the trustee in bankruptcy, is nevertheless the primary
fund against which the liability of the debtor may be expected to be discharged.
RIGHTS OF A MORTGAGEE OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES AGAINST A SUBSEQUENT PURCIIASER
A FURNITURE dealer executed a note to plaintiff, giving as security a chattel mort-
gage upon all chattel mortgages which the dealer then possessed upon furniture he had
sold, and upon all chattel mortgages which he might thereafter acquire.' Plaintiff
duly recorded his mortgage. Subsequently, the mortgagor sold a large number of
the underlying chattel mortgages to the defendant at 35 per cent of their face value,
and then left the state leaving unpaid his note to the plaintiff. The latter brought
suit for the return of the chattel mortgages. A judgment for the plaintiff in the trial
court was modified and affirmed on appeal. 2 The court held that although a mort-
gage on a mortgage is good between the parties, its recording would not alone con-
stitute notice to a subsequent purchaser. Since, however, the mortgagor was willing
to sell the chattel mortgages at such a discount, the defendant was held to have been
16. (1935) 21 IOwA L. REv. 145.
1. The mortgage also covered all furniture then owned by the mortgagor and all future
purchases that he might make. He retained possession of the furniture with the right
to sell in the regular course of business; in event, of sale, the lien of the mortgage would
automatically be transferred to the proceeds of the sale and to any chattel mortgages received,
2. Alford v. Martin, 176 S. C. 207, 180 S. E. 13 (1935).
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put on inquiry to see if the mortgages were mortgaged. Plaintiff was therefore
allowed to recover the chattel mortgages and all money collected upon them, the
defendant, however, being credited for the amount paid for the mortgages, although
held not entitled to credit for the reasonable expenses of making collections.
Although this case appears to be one of first impression, nevertheless, in the light
of previous decisions in regard to mortgages of choses in action, it involves no
departure from established law to hold that present or after-acquired chattel mort-
gages may be mortgaged 3 For, mortgages given on life insurance policies, 4 book
accounts, 5 shares of stock,6 leaseholds,7 vested remainders in personalty s the equity
of redemption of a mortgagor after default,9 interests under executory contracts,10
funds in court," and expectant legacies,' 2 have been held valid. And it has been
held that a valid mortgage may be given on a chose in action to be acquired in the
future.13
Whether such a mortgage is good against all third parties, however, depends upon
the effect given to recordation. Clearly, the chattel mortgage in the instant case
-was entitled to recordation under the local statute; and the statutes language
strongly indicates that recordation should operate as constructive notice to all par-
ties.' 4 Under similar statutes, the recording of a mortgage on a chose in action has
been held to be notice. 15 Moreover, in analogous cases it has been held that an
innocent purchaser of a chose in action acquired no rights against a prior claim-
ant, even though there had been no recordation. Thus, where the owner of a
3. The general rule is that any personal property capable of being sold may 1,e the
subject of a chattel mortgage. 1 Jo.Ns, CirAxrTr MorTG.%GEs (6th ed. 1933) § 114.
This rule includes intangible property interests. Ellis Jones Drug Co. v. Colker, 151
Miss. 102, 117 So. 545 (1928); Tuttle v. Blow, 176 Mo. 158, 75 S. W. 617 (1903); cf.
Foorman v. Boland. 59 Mont. 185, 196 Pac. 147 (1921).
4. King v. Van Vleck, 109 N. Y. 363, 16 N. E. 547 (1883).
S. Bank of Dillon v. Murchison, 213 Fed. 147 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914) (applying South
Carolina law); see generally, Comment (1935) 44 Yu.% L. J. 639; cf. Robinson v.
Empey, 10 B. C. 466 (Can. 1904).
6. Campbell v. Woodstock Iron Co., 83 Ala. 351, 3 So. 369 (1887) (business corpora-
tion); Manns v. Brookville Nat. Bk., 73 Ind. 243 (ISSI) (bank); Durkee .,. Stringham,
S Wis. 1 (1858) (joint stock company).
7. Gill v. Weston, 110 Pa. St. 312, 1 Atl. 921 (18S5) (leasehold in oil land).
8. Tilden v. Tilden, 26 Misc. 672, 57 N. Y. S. 864 (Sup. Ct. 1899).
9. Central Finance Corp. v. Norton-Morgan Commercial Co., 23 Ariz. 517, 20S Pac.
510 (1922); J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Johnson, 152 Wis. 8, 139 N. W. 445
(1913).
10. Forman v. Proctor, 4S Ky. 124 (1848); cf. Sykes v. Hannawalt, 5 N. D. 335, 65
N. W. 682 (1895).
11. Webster v. Industrial Acceptance Corp., 234 Ky. 613, 28 S. W. (2d) 959 (1930).
12. Bacon v. Bonham, 27 N. J. Eq. 209 (1876).
13. Dunn v. Michigan Club, 115 Mich. 409, 73 N. W. 386 (1897) (future as well as
present book accounts may be subject of a chattel mortgage); Buvinger v. Evening
Union Printing Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 321, 65 At. 432 (1907).
14. S. C. Crv. ConF (1932) § 8875. Cf. Brown v. Rankin, 103 S. C. 371, 84 S. E.
1001 (1915).
15. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Brown, 262 N. IV. 124 (Iowa 1935) (lea es
and rent notes); Commercial Trust Co. v. L. Wertheim Coal & Coke Co., 83 N. J. Eq.
143, 102 At. 448 (1917) (present and after-acquired book accounts). Contra: Spalding
v. Paine, 81 Ky. 416 (1883) (shares of stock); Woodward v. Laporte, 70 Vt. 399, 41
AUt. 443 (1898) (promissory note).
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chose in action made two assignments, the first assignee prevailed over the second
assignee, even though the latter was an innocent purchaser for value without notice
and first notified the debtor of the assignment.10 And trust receipts of choses in
action, though unrecorded, have been held valid against third parties.1
In the instant case, however, the court apparently was moved by what it regarded
as practical considerations to decide that the recordation of a chattel mortgage
of chattel mortgages is not constructive notice to all parties. Although recognizing
that, ordinarily, recordation constitutes notice, the court distinguished personal prop-
erty which may be transferred and assigned by indorsement and delivery, and held
that to require a prospective purchaser to search the records to find out whether
such papers were covered by a chattel mortgage would impose too great a burden.
Such reasoning would, of course, be applicable not only to a mortgage of chattel
mortgages but to mortgages of any choses in action which may be assigned by
indorsement and delivery, or by delivery alone, and would, in effect, render nuga-
tory the statutory provision permitting the recordation of such choses in action.
For, unless that recordation is held to be constructive notice to all third parties,
it is virtually useless to the mortgagee. Moreover, the reasoning of the court,
carried to its logical conclusion, would affect other credit operations as well as that
effected by a mortgage. Thus, if the transaction in the instant case had been
financed by means of a trust receipt of the chattel mortgages, under the reasoning
of the court the lender would not have been protected against third parties, even
though the trust receipt were recorded. And the same result would follow if there
had been an assignment to the lender without physical delivery of the chattel
mortgages. For, in either instance, to require a subsequent purchaser of the chose
in action to take notice of recordation of an assignment or trust receipt would
put upon him such a burden as was in the instant case held to render the recordation
inoperative. As a consequence, the only practicable remaining way to secure credit
upon the basis of choses in action would be by means of an assignment with actual
physical delivery of the papers.'
8
While such an assignment may prevent fraudulent sales and to that extent protect
not only the lender, but third parties as well, nevertheless, in some situations, it
might be far less practicable and desirable, from the viewpoint of both borrower
and lender, than a chattel mortgage, a trust receipt, or an assignment without
physical delivery of the documents. Thus, where, as in the instant case, the
chattel mortgages of the furniture dealer were constantly being discharged, and
new ones taken on other furniture, the lender might not wish to incur the incon-
venience of making collections on the mortgages. Again, he might not be willing
to entrust them to the dealer for purposes of collection, without obtaining the pro-
tection against sale to third parties, which the recordation statute was supposed
to provide. Moreover, the dealer might be unwilling to have the lender collect
upon the chattel mortgage, both because of the possibly greater expense to the
16. Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182 (1924). See Com-
ment (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 767.
17. Century Throwing Co. v. Muller, 197 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 3d, 1912) (pledgee);
In re Dunlap Carpet Co., 206 Fed. 726 (E. D. Pa. 1913) (purchaser); cf. Mershon v.
Moors, 76 Wis. 502, 45 N. W. 95 (1890) (creditors).
18. Discounting the choses in action at a bank would involve a similar physical delivery
of the documents. On assignments generally, see Cook, The Alienability of Choses in
Action (1916) 29 HAav. L. Rzv. 816; Corbin, Assignment of Contract Riglits (1926) 74 U.
Op PA. L. REv. 207.




dealer and the unfavorable reflections upon his credit position which might result.
And while it may be possible to have the note holder retain the chattel mortgages
until needed in the dealer's business, and then turn them over upon receipt of other
security, such an arrangement might well prove highly inconvenient and imprac-
ticable. In the last analysis, the question seems to resolve itself into whether it
is deemed preferable to give effect to the recordation statute in the case of choses
in action which are freely assignable, and hold such recordation to be notice to
all parties, with the consequence of harming some innocent purchasers, or instead,
virtually to eliminate all devices for securing credit upon choses in action other
than by a physical delivery and assignment of the documents. This matter of
policy would seem better fitted for legislative than judicial determination.
Since the mortgagor in the instant case was willing to sell the mortgages at such
a great discount, however, the court held that the defendant was charged with
notice. In spite of this holding, the court, evidently attempting to reach a rough
compromise, modified the lower court's judgment by allowing the defendant credit
for the price which he had paid for the mortgages. In view of the fact that the
defendant was held to have been charged with notice, the result reached by the
court is contrary to the great weight of authority, which would entitle the plaintiff
in such circumstances to recover the chattel mortgages and all that had been col-
lected upon them.' 9 Moreover, since the modification of the lower court's judg-
ment was a material one, the defendant was also allowed the costs of the appeal,
the decision thus putting almost the entire loss on the plaintiff, notwithstanding
her apparent victory.20
METHODS OF SECURING LESSOR AAINST RENTAL DEFAULTS ON LoNG Tnmr LEAsEs
To minimize the risks attendant upon long-term leases, landlords have resorted to
various devices by which the lessee, upon execution of the lease, places the landlord
in possession of assets sufficient to assure that if the lessee becomes financially unable
to pay the rent, the lessor will nevertheless be able to have satisfaction for the
damages thereby incurred.' By one device, the lessee deposits with the lessor upon
execution of the lease some form of security to insure faithful performance. Where
the security is simply a fund from which the landlord may retrieve damages in the
event of a breach, returning the balance, the courts will not interfere.2 But where
19. The established rule is that when the mortgagor of personalty sells it to a purchaser
who has actual or constructive notice of the mortgage, the mortgagee may recover the
property, or, if it has been converted, he is entitled to its value. Denver Live Stock
Comm. Co. v. Lee, 18 F. (2d) 11 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Ruby v. Cox, 191 Ky. 162, 229
S. W. 127 (1921); 2 Joetrs, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 484, 488, 490. The South Carolina
courts had consistently followed this rule. Little v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 156 S. C.
480, 153 S. E. 462 (1930); Bank of Norris v. Pates & Allen Co., 103 S. C. 361, 94 S. E.
881 (1918).
20. The face value of the chattel mortgages purchased by defendant was QS5S; the
price he paid for them was $299.25; and the costs of defendant's appeal which the
plaintiff had to pay amounted to over $200. There was still due plaintiff upon the original
note $1,425.07 and interest. In comparison with the plaintiffs heavy loss, defendant was
only inconvenienced to the extent of making collections for a short time upon the chattel
mortgages.
1. See Wilson, Lease Security Deposits (1934) 34 CoL. L. Rsv. 426.
2. Cf. In re Frey, 26 F. (2d) 472 (E. 1). Pa. 1928); Neuhaus v. Norgard, 140 Cal.
App. 735, 35 P. (2d) 1039 (1934).
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the total amount of the security is specified as liquidated damages for a breach, the
courts frequently disallow the provision as a penalty and compel the lessor to return
the deposit minus actual damages.3 By another device, the lessee, upon execution of
the lease, pre-pays the rent for the last portion of the term. In many jurisdictions,
such payment is regarded as the absolute property of the landlord, against which a
defaulting lessee has no claim.4 But where the amount of the payment is dispro-
portionate to the damages suffered by the lessor, the courts, by looking to the sub.
stance of the entire covenant, frequently interpret the "advance rent" as a security
deposit, and treat it accordingly.5
A third, and less common device, is well illustrated by a recent California case.
The lessee, besides giving as consideration for the lease contract his promise to pay
monthly rental in advance and to perform other duties, made a payment of $10,000
to the lessor upon execution of the lease "in further consideration" for the lessor's
signing of the lease. It was agreed that the lessee had no claim for any allowance
or rebate because of the payment of such consideration. In return, the lessor con-
tracted that, "for faithful performance and only in that event," he would rebate to
the lessee $41.66 on each month's rent for the first seven years and two months of
the eight year term, $391 on the next month's rent, and $1,100 per month on each
of the remaining nine months' rent. When the lessee fell behind in the payment of
rent, the lessor brought an action of unlawful detainer, declared the lease terminated,
and had judgment for $2,975.02 damages. The lessee, contending that the $10,000
was in substance either a deposit or an unlawful stipulation for liquidated damages,
brought suit for return of the $10,000 minus the $2,975.02 damages, or $7,024.98.
The court held, however, that the $10,000 was in form an absolute payment of con-
sideration for obtaining the lease; and, consequently, the lessor was permitted not
only to retain the entire $10,000 but also to collect an additional $2,975.02 in
damages.0
If there had been no provision for any allowance or rebates, there would have
been no doubt that the $10,000 was really a part of the consideration7 An ex-
amination of the substance of the lease, however, discloses that the various pay-
ments bear to each other a peculiar relationship which suggests that the $10,000 was
intended to be a provision for liquidated damages or a security deposit. The lessor,
in allowing a monthly rebate of $41.66 was actually paying to the lessee 5% interest
for the use of $10,000. The rebate of $391 plus the rebates of $1,100 appears to
have been a plan to return the $10,000 with interest at approximately 5%. And
it is a characteristic of a depositary, not of an owner, that he pay interest on money
3. Redmon v. Graham, 211 Cal. 491, 295 Pac. 1031 (1931); Yuen Suey v. Fleshman,
65 Ore. 606, 133 Pac. 803 (1913); see Comment (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 307. But cf. Bar-
rett v. Monro, 69 Wash. 229, 124 Pac. 369 (1912), severely criticized in BAUEm, CAsEs ON
THE LAW or DA amAES (2d ed. 1932) 251, n. 7.
4. Pigg v. Kelley, 92 Cal. App. 329, 268 Pac. 463 (1928); Schoen v. New Britain Trust
Co., 111 Conn. 466, 150 AtI. 696 (1930) (citation of authority on both sides); Galbraith v.
Wood, 124 Minn. 210, 144 N. W. 945, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1034 (1914) (leading case).
Contra: Cunningham v. Stockon, 81 Kan. 780, 106 Pac. 1057 (1910).
5. Cf. Jensen v. Sparkes, 53 F. (2d) 433 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931); Rez v. Summers, 34
Cal. App. 527, 168 Pac. 156 (1917); see Note (1931) 25 ILL. L. REV. 716.
6. A-1 Garage v. Lange Investment Co., 44 P. (2d) 681 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935), cert.
denied, 56 S. Ct. 178 (1935); cf. Matter of Minnis, 56 S. Ct. 176 (1935) (order to show
cause why lessee's attorney should not be disbarred from further practice before the
Supreme Court because of the use of unbecoming expressions in his brief against the
purported inequity of the decision in the principal case).
7. In re Sun Drug Co., 4 F. (2d) 843 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925).
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in his own possession. It would seem, therefore, that the $10,000 was simply a
security deposit or a liquidated damage provision masquerading under the term
"further consideration."
8
There is ample precedent, nevertheless, for the decision of the court to look to
the form rather than to the substance of the lease. 9 But since the consequences of
the decision are harsher than the results which would follow from the enforcement
of even a penalty clause, it might have been more equitable for the court to have
called the $10,000 a valid provision for liquidated damages, thereby compelling the
lessee to abide by the clear words of the contract giving him rebates "for faithful
performance and only in that event." However, the courts of California have inter-
preted their Code as rendering liquidated damage provisions in lease contracts
illegal.30 Hence, the court in the instant case had but two alternatives, either to look
to the form of the lease and award the lessor the "consideration" of $10,C0 plus
his damages, or to look to the substance of the lease and award the lessee the
"security deposit" of $10,000 minus the lessor's damages. The latter alternative
might have been preferable, since the lessor would then have received adequate
reparation for his loss without the imposition of any additional, seemingly punitive
assessment against the lessee.
EFFECT OF NoTicE or THEFT TO SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER OF STOLEN NEGOTIBLE
BONDS
NEGOTIABLE highway bonds having been stolen from the plaintiff, he immediately
caused printed notices of the theft with adequate descriptions of the bonds to be sent
to dealers throughout the country. One of these notices was received, presumably by
the mail clerk, at the Chicago office of defendant corporation, a dealer in municipal
bonds; but no attention was given it.1 Two weeks later, defendant purchased these
stolen bonds for full value from a listed dealer at St. Paul, Minnesota. Although the
defendant contented itself with making certain that the offeror was a listed dealer,
making no further investigation before purchase to ascertain whether the bonds were
stolen, no circumstance suggested conscious wrongdoing. Plaintiff claimed the bonds
8. Cf. Walter H. Sullivan, Inc. v. Johnson, 116 Cal. App. 591, 3 P. (2d) 72 (1931),
which the court distinguished from the principal case on the ground that the leae in the
Sullivan case was ambiguous and, therefore, a proper subject for judicial interpretation.
A provision for restitution of the $10,000 upon termination of the lease through fault
of the landlord, fire, or act of God would have been additional evidence that the lesor
had something less than absolute ownership of the sum. Cf. Rez v. Summers, 34 Cal.
App. 527, 168 Pac. 156 (1917). However, the lease is not set out in full in the court's
opinion on the principal case.
9. Cf. Curtis v. Arnold, 43 Cal. App. 97, 184 Pac. S10 (1919); Chicago Trust Co. v. 12-
14 W. Washington Street Building Corp., 278 Ill. App. 117 (1934); Dutton v. Chrsie, 63
Wash, 372, 115 Pac. 856 (1911) (leading case).
10. Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1931) §§ 1670, 1671, 3334, 3335, 3345; see Moore
v. Investment Properties Corp., 71 F. (2d) 711, 718 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934). But cf. (1935)
23 CAi.I. L. REV. 518.
1. Though defendant was accustomed to receive notices of stolen bonds, it apparently
had adopted no settled policy as to the handling of them. No records of such notices vere
kept, nor was any employee instructed to circulate them, nor was any attempt made to
examine them before bonds were purchased. It seems that it was the practice to put them
in a drawer, and to disregard them.
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on the theory that the receipt of notice by the clerk of the defendant corporation
gave the defendant actual knowledge of the defect in the bonds and thus prevented
it from becoming a holder in due course. The Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, following a decision of an Illinois appellate court, agreed
with the plaintiff's contention, but was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.2
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the latter decision, holding that, since
the defendant corporation purchased in good faith, it became a holder in due
course.
3
Since the Negotiable Instruments Law has been held to apply to bearer bonds in
spite of vigorous opposition by writers on the subject, 4 one who fits the description
of a holder in due course under the Negotiable Instruments Law acquires good title
to such bonds, even though they have been stolen.5 The Negotiable Instruments
Law defines a holder in due course as one who, in addition to satisfying other con-
ditions, has taken the instrument in good faith, and without notice at the time of
negotiation to him of any defect in the title of the person negotiating it.o To con-
stitute notice of defect in title, "the person to whom it is negotiated must have had
actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that Ids
action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith." 7  "Actual knowledge" has
seemingly been interpreted to mean only such knowledge of defects as is actually
present in the mind of the purchaser at the time of the purchase; 8 and "knowledge
of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad "faith" has
2. White-Phillips Co. v. Graham, 74 F. (2d) 417 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934)
3. Graham v. White-Phillips Co., 56 Sup. Ct. 21 (Nov. 1935).
4. See S-H ND MooRE, CASES oz; Bma~s m Noms (3d ed. 1932) 1 n.; Steffen and
Russell, The Negotiability of Corporate Bpnds (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 799; Comment (1925)
25 COL. L. REv. 71.
5. City of Adrian v. Whitney Cent. Nat. Bk., 180 Mich. 171, 146 N. W. 654 (1914);
State v. Nebraska State Say. Bk., 127 Neb. 262, 255 N. V. 52 (1934); Enoch v. Brandon,
249 N. Y. 263, 164 N. E. 45 (1928); see Note (1919) 1 A. L. R. 717.
Those who oppose the application of the N. I. L. to bonds would nevertheless favor
rendering them negotiable by common law recognition of custom. See Steffen and Russell,
loc. cit. supra note 4.
6. N. I. L. § 52: A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under
the following conditions:
1. That it is complete and regular upon its face;
2. That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice
that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact;
3. That he took it in good faith and for value;
4. That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity
in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it.
7. N. I. L. § 56. Though courts do not articulate clearly the distinctions between "actual
knowledge" and "bad faith," it seems that the former concerns knowledge of the ultimate
fact of infirmity of title while the latter refers to knowledge of such facts as strongly
indicate the ultimate fact. See Gigoux v. Moore, 105 Kan. 361, 365, 184 Pac. 637, 639
(1919); Legis. (1933) 81 U. or PA. L. REv. 617, 620; cf. Rightmire, Bad Faith in Negotiable
Paper (1920) 18 MicH. L. REv. 355, 365-367.
8. NORTON, BILs AND No s (4th ed. 1914) §§ 125-127a; cf. Comment (1934) 9 TuANn
L. Rxv. 128. Yet, since it is impossible to look into the mind of an individual, such good
or bad faith necessarily can be established only by approximation from circumstances and
inference. See Arnd v. Aylesworth, 145 Iowa 185, 190, 191, 123 N. W. 1000, 1002, 1003
(1909); Link v. Jackson, 158 Mo. App. 63, 82, 83, 139 S. W. 588, 593 (1911); BIGoELOW,
BmLs AN NoTES (3d ed. 1928) 367.
been held to mean only actual bad faith or dishonesty. Since the test as to whether
or not the purchaser has taken without notice of defects is one of subjective good
or bad faith, gross negligence of the purchaser in failing to use available informa-
tion and even his one-time actual knowledge of the defect in title are not neces-
sarily sufficient to prevent such purchaser from becoming a holder in due course,
but are only possible evidence of bad faith or dishonesty. Thus, one is under no
duty to pay attention to newspaper notices of stolen bonds,1 o and one who has ex-
amined a notice of stolen bonds may at a later time become a holder of them in due
course by establishing that the notice had been forgotten and that the transaction
was in good faith.11
The question as to what effect an agent's receipt of notice of the theft of the bonds
has upon the rights of the corporate principal purchasing thereafter has rarely arisen
in the courts.12 Since, however, an individual is privileged to disregard notices of
stolen bonds, it would seem that a corporation should be allowed to do likewise. And
since the test is one of subjective good faith at the time of purchase, the purchase in
good faith of stolen bonds by officers of a corporation should permit the corporation
to be a holder in due course, even though notice of theft had been received by a mail
clerk who negligently failed to communicate it to other agents.13 Thus, the instant
decision, in establishing that security houses are under no duty to investigate notices
of bond thefts which have been received, seems to be easily supportable on principle.
9. Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110 (U. S. 1864); see 2 DA.-,-Nxr Ncorminr. Insrnu-
mms (7th ed. 1933) § 892; Joi-s, CORPORATE BoN.s & Mo =Arcs (3d ed. 1907) § 200;
2 PAToz's Diorsr or BA K=nG LAw (1926) § 3121a; Legis. (1933) 81 U. or PA. L. Rmy.
617.
10. Smith v. Harlow, 64 Mle. 510 (1864); Manhattan Say. Inst. v. New York Nat.
Ex. Bk., 42 App. Div. 147, 59 N. Y. Supp. 51 (1st Dep't, 1899), 53 App. Div. 635, 65 N.
Y. Supp. 757 (1900), aff'd 170 N. Y. 58, 62 N. E. 1079 (1902); cf. English American Loan
& Trust Co. v. Biers, 112 Ga. 823, 38 S. E. 103 (1901) (note); Kellogg v. French, 81
Mass. 354 (1860) (bill of exchange).
Also, proof that a printed notice was left on a desk in the office of a bank before
banking hours did not prevent the bank from becoming a holder in due cours, since it
was not established that the notice was seen by anybody in the office. Seybel v. National
Currency Bank, 54 N. Y. 288 (1873); cf. Raphael v. Bank of England, 33 Eng. L. & Eq.
Rep. 276, 17 C. B. 161 (1855).
11. Lord v. Wilkinson, 56 Barb. 593 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1870); see Vermilye & Co. v.
Adams Express Co., 21 Wall. 138, 146 (U. S. 1874); Merchants Nat'l Bk. v. Detroit Trust
Co., 258 Mich. 526, 536, 242 N. W. 739, 743 (1932).
12. A related problem arises when an officer of a corporation in an individual capacity
acquires an instrument with no knowledge of any infirmity, though the corporation itself
has notice of the defect through other agents. It has been held that the officer is a bolder
in due course. King v. Doane, 139 U. S. 166 (1891); Pitman v. Walker, 187 Cal. 667, 203
Pac. 739 (1922) ; Dodo v. Stocker, 74 Colo. 95, 219 Pac. 222 (1923), noted (1924) 8 irzn.
L. REv. 336, (1924) 72 U. or PA. L. Rxv. 317. Contra: McCarty v. Kepreta, 24 N. D.
395, 139 N. W. 992 (1913); Hardin v. Dale, 45 Okla. 694, 146 Pac. 717 (1915); McCredle
v. Elmer, 132 Ore. 368, 284 Pac. 573 (1930) eable, noted (1930) 30 CoL. L. Rrv. 742.
13. The few courts that have considered this problem have generally held that the
corporation is a holder in due course. Merchants Nat'l Bk. v. Detroit Trust Co., 258 Mich.
526, 242 N. W. 739 (1932), noted (1933) 27 Ir. L. Rnv. $65, (1933) 31 M1cmr. L. Rxv.
424; cf. Heney v. Sutro & Co, 28 Cal. App. 698, 153 Pac. 972 (1915); National Bk. v.
Uptown State Bk., 273 Ill. App. 401 (1934). Contra: Northwestern Nat'l Bk. v. Madison
& Kedzie St. Bk., 242 111. App. 22 (1926), noted and criticized (1926) 40 HL nV. L. Rav.
315.
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Yet, the relative ease with which theft of negotiable bonds may be successfully ac-
complished suggests the desirability of improving the means of protection. One
method might be by state legislation making notices in a prescribed form containing
adequate description of the stolen bonds, properly addressed and sent by registered
mail, or shown to have been actually received, constitute notice to the addressee. 14
The effect would be that those security houses which have not already done so
would adopt a practice both of filing such notices and referring to them before making
purchases.' 5 Consequent reduction of the market for stolen bonds would tend to
reduce the amount of theft, and also to improve the rightful owner's chances of
recovery. The argument most often advanced against the creation of this duty is
that it would impair the free negotiation of bonds. Such a requirement would cer-
tainly affect the negotiability of stolen bonds, and might introduce some delay in
the purchase of other bonds to permit reference to the filing system. But the time
expended in fulfilling this requirement would be slight when compared with the
amount of time devoted by most security dealers to investigating the merit of bonds
before purchase. A somewhat less rigid, though perhaps even more adequate pro-
tection might be effected by federal legislation providing that notices in proper form
to designated stock exchanges should be made public by the latter directly or through
a central agency, in a manner calculated to make the notices reasonably accessible to
all dealers. 16
A third and supplementary method of protection might be effected by amending
the Negotiable Instruments Law to treat registered bonds, which have thus far been
considered non-negotiable instruments, as payable to order and negotiable. This
change, by adding the advantages of negotiability to the protection against successful
14. For more than 35 years Germany has placed its security dealers under such a duty
to take notice. If bearer bonds are sold or pledged to " . . . a mercantile trader carrying
on a banking or change business, evidence of such mercantile trader's good faith will be
inadmissible if at the time of such sale or pledging the loss of such instrument has been
notified in the German Imperial Gazette . . . and if not more than one year has elapsed
from the expiration of the year in which such notification was made." See SCnusrM,
THE GEitawx Corn:ERcmi. CoDE (1911) § 367.
15. In this connection, it may be noted that, according to a communication of December
17, 1935, from the Secretary of the New York Stock Exchange to the YALE LAW JouRnAL,
although "No concerted effort has ever been made to have all notices of this kind given to
the Exchange," nevertheless, a record of the hundreds of thousands of those which have
been received are kept in a card index file, to which reference may be made "Every time
a certificate of stock or a bond is presented at the Exchange for an expression of opinion
as to its availability for delivery against a transaction made on this Exchange." In ihe
event of discovery that such a certifiate of stock or bond has been lost or stolen, "both
the person who presents the security and the person who gave the notice are notified
immediately."
16. Thus, a federal statute might designate the New York Stock Exchange as the
central agency for daily dissemination to every other national exchange of lists of all
notices of stolen bonds received by the central agency on the preceding day. The other
exchanges might, then, be required to publish such lists in the important newspapers of
their locality. Persons from whom bonds are stolen might be directed to notify the New
York Stock Exchange directly or to notify their local exchange, which, in turn, would
communicate all such notices to the central agency for national dissemination. Although such
a law would place no legal duty upon security houses, the ease of obtaining adequate in-
formation about stolen bonds would tend to increase the use of such information and thus
to decrease the chances of successful theft.
theft afforded by registration, would cause investors to prefer the registered bond to
the bearer bond, and thus tend to eliminate the problem of protection against theft
of bearer bonds, raised by the instant case.' 7
SuccEssmVE APPLICATIONS FOR HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS r-;
INTERSTATE RENDITION
THE relator, having been charged with murder in Tennessee, was arrested in
Illinois on an extradition proceeding instituted by Tennessee authorities. He applied
for a writ of habeas corpus in an Illinois county court, seeking release on the ground
of non-compliance with the Federal Interstate Rendition Law. After hearing, the
county court dismissed the writ and remanded the relator to custody; this judg-
ment was affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court of Illinois. Thereupon, relator
sought a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court on the same ground that
he had relied on in the Illinois courts. Although admitting that it had jurisdiction,
and although it had granted the writ, partially heard the cause, and announced its
view that the federal rendition procedure had not been properly foUlloved, the court
nevertheless finally discharged the writ on the ground that on principles of comity
the lower federal courts should not interfere with the state determination in habeas
corpus proceedings, the proper procedure for the petitioner being to seek revision
of the final decision of the state courts in the United States Supreme Court. The
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed on the ground that, having
gone as far in the habeas corpus proceedings as it had, the lower court should not
have refused on grounds of comity to finally adjudicate the cause and release the
prisoner for non-compliance of the Tennessee authorities with the Federal Interstate
Rendition Law.' The effect of this decision is to permit a fugitive from justice to
litigate extradition proceedings first through the state courts and then to begin all
over again in the lower federal courts. In the instant case the proceeding extended
over a period of three and one-half years after the alleged murder.
The jurisdiction of the federal courts to release, on writ of habeas corpus, persons
restrained of their liberty in violation of the Constitution, laws and treaties of the
United States is well recognized; and this power extends even to prisoners held in the
custody of a state.2 On the other hand, the federal courts on principles of comity
are reluctant to interfere summarily with the course of criminal justice in the states.
Thus, they will not intervene by habeas corpus proceedings to release a prisoner held
in custody of a state for violation of its criminal laws, even though it is claimed
that he is held in violation of the Constitution,3 except in cases of urgency where
17. For a complete exposition of this position, see Steffen and Russell, Registered Bonds
and Negotiability (1934) 47 HARv. L. Rmv. 741; Steffen, A Proposed Uniform Act Mahng
Investment Instruments Negotiable (1934) 34 COL. L. Pmv. 632.
1. United States ex rel. McCline v. Meyering, 75 F. (2d) 716 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934). The
state court decision is found in People ex rel. McCline v. Meyering, 356 Ill. 210. 190 X. E.
261 (1934). The Circuit Court of Appeals released the prisoner on the technical ground
that while the requisition of the Governor of Tennessee contained a certified warrant, the
accompanying affidavit had not been certified in accordance with the federal statute, which
requires the certification of either an indictment or an affidavit.
2. 14 STAT. 385 (1867), 2S U. S. C. A. § 453 (1926); Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241
(1886); DoBi, FEDERAL JURIsDIcTION AND ProcrovRE (1923) § 79.
3. Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241 (1S36); DoBir, op. cit. supra note 2, § SM; Williams,
Federaj Habeas Corpus (1924) 9 ST. Louis L. REv. 250.
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the prisoner is in custody for an act done in pursuance of a federal law4 or in the
course of his duty as a federal officer.5 Under this rule of non-intervention the
federal courts compel the prisoner to exhaust his state remedies and then appeal
to the United States Supreme Court. The rule applies when the prisoner is in state
custody pending trial6 or after conviction,1 irrespective of whether or not he has
first sought release on habeas corpus in the state courts,8 and even when he has lost
his right to review by the United States Supreme Court.9
Interstate rendition cases, where the prisoner who has been arrested in the
asylum state petitions a federal court for habeas corpus before his deportation, do
not involve the same question of interference with state criminal justice as do the
cases embraced within the non-intervention rule. Interstate rendition is entirely
governed by federal law.10 Thus, while the prisoner is held under an executive war-
rant issued by the governor of the asylum state, the latter in issuing such a warrant
as the representative of the state is acting under the Federal Interstate Rendition
Law.1' Therefore a judicial review of this action of the governor on a writ of
habeas corpus' 2 is clearly within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.18 However,
this jurisdiction is not exclusive. The courts of the asylum state, being equally bound
to give effect to federal law, have concurrent jurisdiction of such review.14
Where, as ifi the instant case, a prisoner held for rendition, with choice of courts,
has first invoked the jurisdiction of the state courts, it would seem that he should
be required to seek review of the final state decision in the United States Supreme
Court,' 5 instead of being permitted to raise again the identical question in the lower
4. In re Loney, 134 U. S. 372 (1890).
5. In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1 (1890); Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276 (1899); In re Waite,
81 Fed. 359 (N. D. Iowa 1897).
6. Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241 (1886); New York v. Eno, 155 U. S. 89 (1894)
(circuit court reversed for intervening); Baker v. Grice, 169 U. S. 284 (1898) (same);
United States ex rel. Drury v. Lewis, 200 U. S. 1 (1906).
7. In re Frederich, 149 U. S. 70 (1893); M1arkuson v. Boucher, 175 U. S. 184 (1899);
Reid v. Jones, 187 U. S. 153 (1902); Knewel v. Egan, 268 U. S. 442 (1925) (district court
reversed for intervening).
8. Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179 (1907) (circuit court reversed for releasing
prisoner after state court had refused to discharge him on habeas corpus); Mooney v.
Holohan, 55 Sup. Ct. 340 (1935) (writ denied where prisoner had not applied to stato
courts for habeas corpus on same grounds).
9. Goto v. Lane, 265 U. S. 393 (1924).
10. U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 2, par. 2; 1 STAT. 302 (1793), 18 U. S. C. A. § 662 (1926),
11. See Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 370 (U. S. 1872); Spa.n, Exzm~inox (3d ed,
1885) 516.12. Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U. S. 691 (1903); Matter of Manchester, S Cal. 237 (1855);
People ex rel. Lawrence v. Brady, 56 N. Y. 182 (1874); SPEAR, op. cit. svpra note 11, 459l
496. The inquiry is as to whether, under the papers accompanying the requisition, the
prisoner is substantially charged with a crime against the laws of the demanding state
and whether he is in fact a fugitive from justice. SPmaI, op. cit. supra note 11, 497-500.
13. In re Roberts, 24 Fed. 132 (S. D. Ga. 1885), affirmed, Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S.
80 (1885); 2 MooRE, ExTRADIoziN AND INTERsTATE RENDITION (1891) § 629. However,
the non-intervention rule applies after the prisoner has been brought within the territorial
jurisdiction of the demanding state, under whose laws he is charged with crime. Cook
v. Hart, 146 U. S. 183 (1892); Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U. S. 231 (1895); Pettibone v.
Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906).
14. Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624 (1884); Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80 (1885).
15. Since federal grounds must always be relied upon in a petition for release on
federal courts. In fact, the Supreme Court has designated this as the proper pro-
cedure.' 6 While the federal courts have the power, in such a case, to release the
prisoner even after the state courts have refused to discharge him, since the doctrine
of res judicata does not strictly apply to habeas corpus proceedings, 17 nevertheless,
there are strong reasons for the lower federal courts' refusing to exercise their power
to hear such cases, just as they have refused to exercise their similar power to inter-
vene in the course of state criminal justice. State boundaries today present practically
no obstacle to a fleeing criminal, and the process of the return of a fugitive across
those boundaries should not be subject to obstruction through the fugitive's use
of successive applications for habeas corpus in the state and federal courts as a
dilatory measure.18 Nor is there any danger to the prisoner's rights in thus giving
comity to state court habeas corpus proceedings. For, the state courts are equally
bound to protect his rights under federal law,'9 and after his rendition to the de-
manding state he still will be entitled to all the protection afforded by the Con-
stitution.2o
Thus, while justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals' denial of comity in the
instant case may be found in the fact that the lower court had gone so far in the
process of adjudicating the writ that dismissal and referral of the petitioner to his
remedy of direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court may have seemed to be
a wasteful procedure, it is nevertheless believed that a uniform policy of giving
comity to the state courts where the litigant has first sought the state remedy is to be
preferred.
habeas corpus in a rendition case, the final determination of the state courts is reviewable
in the United States Supreme Court on certiorari although not on writ of error. 43 StrT.
937 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. § 344 (1926); Ireland v. Woods, 246 U. S. 323 (1918). In the
instant case the relator did not even apply to the Supreme Court for certiorari to review the
judgment of the Illinois court.
16. Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U. S. 222 (1906); Ex parte Graves, 269 Fed. 461
(D. Mass. 1920); see 2 MooRB, op. it. supra note 13, § 631.
17. A prisoner may make succ essive applications for the writ to various judges on
identical grounds, although some effect is often given to prior adjudications. Salinger v.
Loisel, 265 U. S. 224 (1924); Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U. S. 239 (1924); State ex
rel. Shapiro v. Wall, 187 Alfinn. 246, 244 N. W. 811 (1932); see In re Roberts, 24 Fed. 132,
133 (S. D. Ga. 1885). However, in the United States there has been a tendency to attach
to a decision on habeas corpus some of the legal incidents of res judicata. See Hum,
HABABs Coanus (2d ed. 1876) 568-576. While at common law a decision on habeas corpus
was not considered a final judgment to which a writ of error would lie, review of such
decisions on appeal or writ of error is now frequently permitted by statute. 43 STmT. 940
(1925), 28 U. S. C. A. § 463 (19-6); ILL. STAr BAR STArs. (1935) c. 60, par. 2.
18. See United States ex rel. McCline v. Mleyering, 75 F. (2d) 716, 719 (C. C. A. 7th,
1934) (dissenting opinion).
19. This is a reason often given for the refusal of the federal courts to intervene by
habeas corpus to release a prisoner held in custody of a state for violation of its crimin3l
laws. Davis v. Burke, 179 U. S. 399 (1900) ; Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U. S. 499 (1901);
United States e-x rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U. S. 13 (1925).
20. See Matter of Straus, 197 U. S. 324, 332-333 (1905); Biddinger v. Commi-oner of
Police, 245 U. S. 128, 132-133 (1917); United States ex rel. Austin v. Williams, 6 F. (2d)
13, 16-17 (E. D. La. 1925), affd, 12 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926).
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